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The Louisiana Business Corporation
Act of 1928
DALE E. BENNETT*
"Adam Jones-General Store," operated by the Jones family
and selling everything from overalls to molasses, has given way
to "Nifty Foods Company," with hundreds of stores and super
stores, and to "Magnus Department Store, Inc.," covering half a
city block. Similar developments in other fields of commerce and
industry have necessitated a pyramiding of individual funds-
the corporate form of business organization has been the answer.
By this device the capital of numerous investors may be accumu-
lated, and the individual's risk of loss is limited to the amount he
chooses to contribute to the venture. The transferable nature of
the shareholder's interest adds to the attractiveness of the invest-
ment and the stability of the enterprise.
The corporate franchise or privilege was originally bestowed
by special legislative fiat, but by the middle of the nineteenth
century general enabling statutes under which a corporation
might organize were quite common in the United States. The
Louisiana Constitution of 1845 expressly provided that business
corporations should not be created by special laws, and that the
legislature should provide general laws under which they might
be organized., The Louisiana Corporation Act of 1914,2 a vast
improvement over its predecessors,3 was rendered obsolete by a
steady increase in the number, size, and complexity of corporate
enterprises. More detailed rules were needed. In 1928 the Lou-
isiana legislature enacted a comprehensive business corporation
statute4 and became the first state to adopt the Uniform Business
Corporation Act, approved by the National Conference of Coin-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Const. of 1845, Art. 123. A similar provision is found in La. Const.
of 1921, Art. IV, § 4.
2. La. Act 267 of 1914.
3. Previous corporation statutes were very limited and inadequate. La.
Act 100 of 1848; La. Act 111 of 1882; La. Act 36 of 1888; La. Act 78 of 1904.
4. La. Act 250 of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1080-1154]. The provisions of
this act are applicable, in general, to existing corporations. La. Act 250 of
1928, § 68 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1148].
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missioners on Uniform State Laws in that year.5 The draftsmen
of the Louisiana statute made several major changes, which will
be hereinafter noted, together with numerous minor alterations
in phraseology. On the whole, however, they followed the Uni-
form Act both as to format and substance. This statute, expressly
labelled the Business Corporation Act,5 provides for the formation
of corporations for any lawful businesses, except those of banking
and insurance, and homestead or building and loan associations.7
The purpose of this discussion of the Louisiana Business Cor-
poration Act shall be two-fold: First, to collect and critically
analyze judicial decisions construing the Louisiana statute or
other statutes similarly patterned after the Uniform Act; and
Second, to provide a general survey and bird's-eye view of the
Louisiana Act, with the hope of indicating some of its possibil-
ities, and to offer a few suggestions as to the formation and oper-
ation of a business corporation.8
FORMATION OF THE CORPORATION
Section 29 of the Act permits incorporation by three or more
natural persons, 0 who must be either of full age or relieved of
5. 9 U.L.A. 38 (Perm. ed. 1932). According to the note in 9 U.L.A. 29 (Supp.
1938), only two other states can be considered as having adopted the Uniform
Act. Idaho adopted about half of the act verbatim and a large number of
other sections with changes. Idaho Laws of 1929, c. 262, Idaho Code Ann.
(1932) §§ 29-101 to 29-164. The other state listed is Washington. Washington
Laws of 1933, c. 185, Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1933) §§ 3803-1
to 3803-68. A number of states have enacted comprehensive modern corpora-
tion laws. Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1931) §§ 277-413 (enacted in 1931); Ill. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 32, § 157.1-157.167 (enacted in 1933); Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§ 25-101 to 25-254 (enacted in 1929); Mich. Comp. Laws
(Mason, Supp. 1935) HI 10135-1 to 10135-193 (enacted in 1931); Minn. Stat.
(Mason, Supp. 1936) HI 7492-1 to 7492-61 (enacted in 1933); Ohio Gen. Code
Ann. (Page, Supp. 1935) §§ 8623-1 to 8623-167 (enacted in 1929); Pa. Stat.
(Purdon, 1936) tit. 15, §§ 2852-1 to 2852-1202 (enacted in 1933 and amended in
1935); Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §§ 3714-3771 (enacted in 1929).
6. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 73 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1153].
7. Id. at § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1081). In Mouton v. First Nat. Life
Ins. Co., 177 So. 431 (La. App. 1937), the court held that since an insurance
company could not be formed under the Business Corporation Act, its pro-
visions were inapplicable to such a corporation.
8. In predicting the probable scope and meaning of those numerous sec-
tions of the act which are yet to be exposed to the fire of judicial determina-
tion, the writer has relied largely upon law review articles, treatise materials
and the Commissioners' Notes to the Uniform Business Corporation Act, 9
U.L.A. (Perm. ed. 1932). Prior decisions of Louisiana and common law courts
also serve as valuable guides, indicating the fundamental purpose and nature
of the rules codified, altered or repealed, as the case may be, by the new statu-
tory provisions.
9. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1081].
10. The term "persons" in earlier Louisiana corporation statutes was
construed to mean "natural persons" and not to include a corporation. Fac-
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minority disabilities by emancipation. There is no requirement
of residence or citizenship," although it is necessary that the
incorporators be shareholders. 12 Such requirements have never
served any practical purpose, for it is always possible for out-of-
state promoters to secure local residents as dummy incorporators
and to furnish them with the requisite qualifying shares. Later,
after the corporation is fully organized, the nominal incorporators
transfer their shares back to the true owners and drop out of the
picture. Similarly, the minimum requirement of three incor-
porators presents no serious obstacle to the individual desiring to
incorporate his business. Members of the family or the office
force of the attorney handling the matter are usually drafted as
nominal organizers.'2
The Articles of Incorporation, which must be executed by
authentic act signed by each of the incorporators, or his duly
authorized agent, provide the framework of the corporation.
They should be drawn carefully, so as to comply with all require-
ments of the Act and to effectuate the true purpose of the or-
ganizers.
Section 314 enumerates those matters which must be stated
in the articles. It is to be noted that a corporation is not limited
to a single purpose.15 Thus, the required purpose clause may ex-
pressly include all business activities in which the corporation is
likely to engage. It is preferable that such additional purposes be
tors & Traders' Ins. Co. v. New Harbor Protection Co., 37 La. Ann. 233, 238
(1885).
An exception is made in cases of consolidation. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 49
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1129] provides that the constituent corporations may
be named as incorporators in the articles of the new consolidated corporation.
11. A limitation found in La. Act 267 of 1914, § 1, that "where there are
only three incorporators husband and wife can not be two of such Incor-
porators," is omitted from the new provision.
The Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 2, 9 U.L.A. 42 (Perm. ed. 1932),
requires that the incorporators be "citizens of the United States or its terri-
tories," but contains no residence requirement.
12. Section 3, 1(1) requires each Incorporator to subscribe for at least
one share.
13. The legal entity of a one-man corporation is generally recognized.
Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] A.C. 22 (the owner's wife and children were
nominal associates); but the sole owner 4iust act honestly and actually
maintain the corporate business separate and distinct from his individual
affairs. Gordon v. Baton Rouge Stores Co., 168 La. 248, 121 So. 759 (1929).
14. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1082].
15. Id. at § 3, I(a) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1082, I(a)]. For an interesting
discussion of the "blank check" available to the draftsman of a corporate
purpose clause, and Its effect upon the "fading star of ultra vires," see Smith,
Review of Cases on Corporations by Ballantine and Lattin (1940) 6 O.S.L.J.
240, 242.
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expressly stated, rather than to rely on the expectation that they
will be regarded as implied from, or incidental to, some stated
purpose.
The duration of the corporation must be set forth.16 The Act
contains no limitation in this respect, but the corporation may
not be given perpetual existence. 7 Where the period of existence
stated in the articles has elapsed, and there has been no amend-
ment thereto, the corporation ceases to exist even as a de facto
corporation.18
The articles should furnish a general outline of the financial
structure of the corporation. They must set out the authorized
number of shares; the classification, preferences, rights, or re-
strictions of the several classes of shares; and the amount of
paid-up capital with which the corporation will begin business."
It is also required that the place of the corporation's registered
office, the names and addresses of its registered agents, and the
name and address of each incorporator, with the number of shares
subscribed for by him, shall be stated in the articles.20 The states
are about evenly divided between the practice of naming the first
directors in the articles and having them elected after incorpora-
tion.2 1 The Louisiana Act leaves it optional with the incorporators,
either to name the first directors or to provide a place where, and
a date (not more than 60 days after execution of the articles)
when, the shareholders shall meet and elect the first directors.2 2
Special provisions may be included dealing with preemptive
rights, dividends of "wasting asset" corporations, et cetera.2 3
Section 4, subsection 124 requires that the corporate name,
which must be stated in the articles, 25 shall indicate a corporate
16. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 3, I(b) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1082, I(b)]. Ninety-
nine years is the duration generally provided for.
17. La. Const. of 1921, Art. 13, § 7.
18. Screwman's Benev. Ass'n of Louisiana v. Monteleone, 168 La. 664, 123
So. 116 (1929), holding that a corporation, which had continued business after
expiration of its charter, was without corporate capacity and could not sue
for specific performance of a contract. See also 8 Fletcher, Corporations, §
3842.
19. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 3, I(e)-(g) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1082, I(e)-(g)].
20. Id. at § 3, I(c), (d), (i) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1082, I(c), (d), (i)].
21. Commissioners' Notes to the Uniform Business Corporation Act, 9
U.L.A. 44 (Perm. ed. 1932). The Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 3, I(g),
requires the naming of the first directors in the articles.
22. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 3, I(h) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1082, I(h)].
23. Id. at § 3, II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1082, II]. These provisions will be
particularly discussed in connection with subsequent sections of the act.
24. Id. at § 4, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1083, I].
25. Id. at § 3, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1082, I].
[Vol. II
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existence by ending with the word Corporation, the word Incor-
porated, or the abbreviation Inc. Subsection II prohibits the
assumption of a name "deceptively similar to the name of any
other domestic corporation or of any foreign corporation author-
ized to do business in this state." A very liberal interpretation of
the term "deceptively similar" was adopted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in the recent case of State v. Conway, 2 which
involved a similar statutory limitation on the names of foreign
corporations seeking to do business in the state. It was there held
that a Tennessee corporation, the "Equitable Securities Corpora-
tion," by adding the term "of Nashville" to its name, had suffici-
ently distinguished itself from "Equitable Securities Company,
Inc.," a domestic corporation.
The protection afforded by the dissimilarity-of-name require-
ment of the Act is considerably broader than the protection avail-
able under general common law rules, in which mere identity or
similarity of names is not regarded as a sufficient basis for re-
lief.27 Subsections III and IV further enlarge upon the common
law by furnishing an opportunity for a person or unincorporated
association anticipating incorporation within a year, or of a for-
eign corporation planning to extend its operations into the state
within such period, to secure advance protection of its trade name
by filing a notice of intention with the Secretary of State.28 This
advance protection expires twelve months from the date of filing
26. 189 La. 272, 179 So. 312 (1938). See discussion of decision, Work of
Louisiana Supreme Court, I LOUISIANA LAW REviEW 314, 406 (1939).
27. "The object of subdivisions III and IV is to supplement other protec-
tion afforded by law in the use of trade or corporate names. In the absence
of statutory provision, an individual or corporation may obtain Injunctive
relief against the use of his or its name both because of the injury to his or
its property right in the name, and because of the possible deception of the
public by the use of the name. But the mere identity or similarity of names
does not furnish ground for relief; there must be either (a) probable decep-
tion of the public, or (b) an appropriation of a property right in a name."
Commissioners' Notes to Section 4 of the Uniform Business Corporation Act,
9 U.L.A. 46 (Perm. ed. 1932). Section 4, III and IV, of the Louisiana act Is
substantially the same as Section 4, III and IV, of the Uniform Business
Corporation Act.
28. Subdivisions III and IV give opportunity for advance protection to
one who anticipates an expansion in business. For example, a baking com-
pany can acquire an exclusive right to a name under the common law, only
In the locality In which it has operated; it may not be able to operate over
the whole United States in one year, but may be able to expand gradually.
In the meantime, its expansion may be balked if an outsider appropriates its
name, subsequent to Its original use by the baking company but prior to Its
use by the baking company in this new field. [See Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet
'16' Shop, 15 F. (2d) 920 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926)]. Subdivisions III and IV are in-
tended to supplement the case law In this respect. Commissioners' Notes to
the Uniform Business Corporation Act No. 3, 9 U.L.A. 47 (Perm. ed. 1932).
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of the notice, and it is expressly provided that "such notice once
given cannot be renewed." The above provisions supplement, but
do not supersede, the general principles of law and equity rela-
tive to unfair competition in the use of trade names. Subsection
V expressly declares that nothing in the section shall be con-
strued as abrogating, limiting, or derogating from those princi-
ples.
Subsection VIII provides that the assumption of a name in
violation of the section shall not affect or vitiate the corporate
existence, but the state or party affected may enjoin the corpora-
tion from doing business under the improper name. In Alabama
a similar result has been reached without express statutory
declaration .2  Inclusion of the provision, however, was a wise
precautionary measure. It forestalls the possibility that assump-
tion of an unlawful corporate name might be considered a defect
in incorporation. At the same time it points the way to the proper
remedy by way of injunctive relief.
After the articles are drafted, the procedure for incorporation
is relatively simple. Section 530 provides that the articles "shall be
recorded with the Recorder of Mortgages of the parish in which
the registered office is situated;" and such recording is designated
as the exact point in the procedure of organization where "the
corporate existence shall begin.' '31 Next, a certified copy of the
articles, bearing proper evidence of recording should be delivered
to the Secretary of State. It then becomes the ministerial duty of
that officer to issue a certificate of incorporation setting out the
date and hour when the articles were recorded and at which cor-
porate existence began.
PRE-INCORPORATION SUBSCRIPTIONS AND SHAREHOLDER LIABILITY
Pre-incorporation subscriptions were treated by a majority of
the early cases as mere continuing offers by the subscribers to the
29. State v. Citizens' Light & Power Co., 172 Ala. 232, 238-239, 55 So. 193,
195 (1911). Anderson, J., declared: "After he [the probate judge charged with
recording the certificates] accepts the name and records the certificate, we
do not think that the similarity of the name would of itself forfeit or author-
ize the vacation of the charter.
The provision was evidently Intended to protect existing corporations
from an interference with their name or business, and an injured one would
no doubt have the right to enjoin the use of the name by the new corpora-
tion."
30. La. Act. 250 of 1928, § 5 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1084).
31. Under the Uniform Act, the corporate existence does not begin until
the certificate of incorporation is issued by the Secretary of State. Uniform
Business Corporation Act, § 5, II, 9 U.L.A. 48 (Perm. ed. 1932).
[Vol. II
THE LOUISIANA CORPORATION ACT
proposed corporation, which might be withdrawn at will and did
not become binding until acceptance by the corporation after its
formation.32 On the other hand, a substantial number of courts
took the view that such subscriptions were of a two-fold nature
and constituted: (1) binding and irrevocable contracts between
the several subscribers to take shares in the proposed corporation,
and (2) continuing offers which the corporation, upon coming
into existence, might accept and make the subscribers sharehold-
ers.3 The result achieved by the second line of decisions was
socially desirable, for it is to the interest of each subscriber that
all others be bound, and it is to the interest of the public that new
corporations should have enforceable subscriptions as resources.
The Louisiana Business Corporation Act carries forward the idea
that pre-incorporation subscriptions should be irrevocable. Section
6, subsection 1,3- declares that, unless otherwise provided in the
writing,5 such subscriptions shall be irrevocable for a period of
one year from the date of signing. After that period subscriptions
may be revoked unless corporate existence has begun. With the
beginning of corporate existence, those who have subscribed for
shares automatically become shareholders, pursuant to an express
provision in Section 5, subsection I. No further act or acceptance
by the newly formed corporation is required. The general right
to avoid the subscription on grounds which would be sufficient
for the recission of a contract is expressly reserved.86 A subscrip-
tion procured by fraud, duress, or undue influence may be re-
scinded, provided that the subscriber has not been guilty of laches
in discovering the fraud or in repudiating the subscription after
the discovery; and provided further that the rights of subsequent
corporate creditors will not be affected.3
32. The leading case of Bryant's Pond Steam-Mill Co. v. Felt, 87 Me. 234,
32 Atl. 888 (1895) was followed in Vermilion Sugar Co. v. Vallee, 134 La. 661,
64 So. 670 (1914). For a full collection of cases see 13 Am. Jur. 333, n. 14, §
227; 4 Fletcher, Corporations, 91, § 1425.
33. Shelby County Ry. v. Crow, 137 Mo. App. 461, 119 S.W. 435 (1909);
Nebraska Chicory Co. v. Lednicky, 79 Neb. 587, 113 N.W. 245 (1907).
34. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 6, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1086, I.
35. Ibid. It is expressly required that the subscription "shall be in writ-
ing." However, in Jackson Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Walle, 105 La. 89, 29 So.
503 (1900), a director who had his name put on the corporate books as a
subscriber for a number of shares was estopped to assert that he never in-
tended to purchase the shares and that no written subscription was executed;
and was held liable to an extent necessary to pay corporate debts.
36. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 6, II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1086, II].
37. In Hunsicker v. Gilham, 163 La. 651, 112 So. 518 (1927), the share-
holder had not been guilty of laches and there were no subsequent creditors.
Rescission was allowed. Accord: Gress v. Knight, 135 Ga. 60, 68 S.E. 834
19401
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After the subscriber's status as a shareholder becomes estab-
lished by the formation of the corporation, the latter may enforce
the subscription according to its terms; and where no time of pay-
ment is stated, the shares are to be paid for on the call of the
board of directors. 8 In case of default in payment, subsection IV
of Section 6, states that, in addition to the usual remedies avail-
able, the corporation may sell the shares at public auction, pro-
vided that it can get a bid of a sum sufficient to cover the unpaid
balance. Where no such bid is secured, the corporation may for-
feit any payments made by the delinquent shareholder to itself
as liquidated damages, and the shares shall be considered as un-
issued and unsubscribed.3 9 As a further means of enforcing the
delinquent shareholder's obligation, Section 2240 gives the corpo-
ration a lien upon shares for any unpaid balance of the purchase
price. Under Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,
adopted in Louisiana,4 1 the validity of such a lien is dependent
upon the corporation's keeping possession of the share certificates.
Also, Section 1642 of the Business Corporation Act prohibits the
issuance of a share certificate until the shares represented are
fully paid for. However, in Minden Syrup Company v. Apple-
gate,43 a corporation, suing an original shareholder to recover the
balance due on stock issued for property at an excessive valuation,
was held to have a lien upon such stock and to be entitled to a
writ of sequestration to prevent the shareholder from disposing
of the stock pending suit.44
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO BEGINNING BUSINESS
It is highly desirable, for the protection of those dealing with
the corporation, that a definite fund should be established in the
corporate treasury before any debts can be incurred. Thus, defi-
nite conditions precedent to the corporation's engaging in busi-
(1910). Cf. Farmer's Loan & Mortg. Co. v. Langley, 166 La. 251, 117 So. 137
(1928), where the court found the evidence as to alleged fraudulent misrep-
resentations insufficient, that the stockholders had been guilty of laches and
that the fraud had been waived.
38. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 6, III [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1086, III].
39. This provision is not found in corresponding Section 6 of the Uniform
Business Corporation Act, 9 U.L.A. 49 (Perm. ed. 1932). It has been described
by one writer as "rather harsh." Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern In-
corporation Statutes (1937) 22 Wash. L. Rev. 305, 317.
40. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 22 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 11021.
41. La. Act 180 of 1910, § 15 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1194].
42. La. Act 50 of 1928, § 16 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1096]. See page 616.
infra, for a full discussion of this section.
43. 150 So. 421 (La. App. 1933).
44. Art. 275(7), La. Code of Practice.
[Vol. II
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ness operations (as distinguished from the inception of corporate
existence) are set out in the Louisiana statute. Section 811 speci-
fies $1,000 as the minimum amount of capital with which business
may be begun. Then too, the articles must state the amount of
paid-in capital with which the corporation will begin business;"
and Section 947 expressly makes the payment of this amount a
further condition precedent to the beginning of corporate busi-
ness operations. Teeth are put in this provision by the imposition
of liability upon the participating officers and upon the directors
not dissenting, for the transaction of business in violation
thereof."'
THE DE FACTO PROBLEM
The general rule, that there can be no de facto corporation
until the articles of incorporation have been filed or recorded as
required by law,49 was incorporated in the Uniform Act. It pro-
vides that where the corporation begins business and incurs debts
before the articles have been filed, the participating officers and
directors shall be personally liable." No liability is imposed on
the shareholders. Interpreting a provision of this type, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court has held that a corporation is not bound
by a contract entered into by its directors before the articles were
filed.51
The fundamental idea that corporate existence shall begin
upon the filing or recording of the articles is definitely stated in
Section 5 of the Louisiana Act, and Section 9, I (a) provides that
45. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 8 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1088]. For a collection
of other statutes with similar minimum requirements, see Rutledge, supra
note 39, at 334, n. 129.
46. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 3, I(g) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1082, I(g)].
47. Id. at § 9, I(b) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1089, I(b)].
48. Id. at § 9, II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1089, II]. The officers and assent-
ing directors are liable jointly and severally with the corporation and each
other.
49. 8 Fletcher, Corporations, 129, § 3820. Among the cases cited is Provi-
dent Bk. & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 116 La. 408, 40 So. 778 (1906), holding that
a recording of the charter was necessary for a de facto corporation under
La. Act 120 of 1904, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1155]. Accord: Spencer Field
& Co. v. Cooks, 16 La. Ann. 153 (1861).
50. Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 8, II, 9 U.L.A. 51 (Perm. ed.
1932).
51. Mootz v. Spokane Racing and Fair Ass'n, 189 Wash. 225, 228-229, 64 P.
(2d) 516, 518, Main, J., declared: "Section 5, chapter 185, page 776, Laws 1933,
after providing for the filing of the articles of incorporation with the secre-
tary of state, provides that, upon the issue of the certificate of incorporation
by that officer, 'the corporate existence shall begin.' No authority has been
cited, and we know of none, which holds that there can be a de facto cor-
poration prior to the time that the articles of incorporation are filed with
the proper officer."
1940]
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the corporation shall not begin business until the articles have
been filed for record. In subsection II of Section 9, however, the
drafters departed from the wording of the Uniform Act. That sub-
section expressly provides for liability of the corporation, jointly
and severally with its participating officers and non-dissenting
directors, in all cases where business is prematurely begun. Fol-
lowing the express mandate of this provision, the Louisiana court
has held that the officers, directors, and the corporation were
jointly and severally liable for a debt incurred prior to the record-
ing of the articles of incorporation.2 Reading Sections 5 and 9, II,
together, we have a situation of corporate liability based upon a
transaction which occurred before the corporation came into ex-
istence. This anomalous result would have been avoided by con-
sistently following the wording of the Uniform Act, which treats
the filing of the articles as the point at which, for all purposes,
corporate existence shall begin.
Section 10"8 provides that the certificate of incorporation,
issued by the Secretary of State, shall be conclusive evidence of
proper incorporation as against all but the State. This section
establishes the definite, easily interpreted rule that once the cer-
tificate is issued, no private party can set up defects in organiza-
tion and collaterally attack the corporate existence. It thus clears
away some of the uncertainties and ambiguities of the de facto
doctrine. 4 It should be noted, however, that where the State is
involved, as in forfeiture proceedings, the certificate is only prima
facie evidence of due incorporation.
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE DOCTRINE REJECTED
There is an erroneous idea, sometimes entertained by courts,
that persons dealing with a corporation are charged with con-
structive notice of the contents of the articles of incorporation
52. Avoyelles Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Ville Platte S. Co., 17 La. App.
56, 135 So. 251 (1931).
53. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 10 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1090]. This section
supersedes La. Act 120 of 1904, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1155], which estab-
lished the requirements of a de facto corporation.
54. 9 U.L.A. 52 (Perm. ed. 1932). The commissioners declare, "The object
of this section [Section 9 of Uniform Business Corporation Act] is to solve
the de facto problem." See also Levin, Blind Spots in the Present Wisconsin
General Corporation Statutes (1939) Wis. L. Rev. 173, 181, where the writer
states, "The purpose of such a provision is obvious. Under it, there would
be no corporation de facto, by estoppel or otherwise, until the certificate of
incorporation has been issued. After the certificate has once been issued, no
attack could be made on the corporate existence, except in an action of quo
warranto brought by the state to challenge the assumption by individuals
of corporate powers."
[Vol. II
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and other documents filed and recorded pursuant to law. Such
notice has occasionally been assigned as a reason for treating the
individual dealing with the corporation as particeps criminis and
denying recovery upon a partially executed ultra vires contract.
Section 1155 removes this confusing element from the field of ultra
vires transactions, by expressly declaring the generally accepted
view that the ,reason for requiring the articles of incorporation
and certain other documents to be filed is that all persons may be
afforded an opportunity to ascertain the contents of such papers.
The purpose is not to charge persons dealing with a corporation
with constructive notice of such documents and the contents
thereof,56 as is true in the case of land registration certificates.
CORPORATE CAPACITY AND AUTHORITY
The concept of limited corporate capacity has been another
source of difficulty and conflict in the ultra vires cases. Some
courts, reasoning from the false premise that a corporation cannot
do what it has no authority to do, have held that no performance
on either side can give any validity to, or be the foundation of,
any right of action upon an ultra vires contract. 7 Section 12, sub-
section I,-" directly repudiates this doctrine by stating a clear-cut
distinction between corporate capacity and authority. The section
declares that a corporation shall have the inherent capacity of
natural persons, but its authority is limited to the doing of such
acts "as are necessary or proper to accomplish its purposes as ex-
pressed or implied in the articles or may be incidental thereto. ' 59
55. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 11 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1091]. A similar pro-
vision in the Michigan Corporation Act makes an exception in the case of
shareholders, officers and directors and charges them with knowledge of
the contents of the articles. Mich. Pub. Act 327 of 1931, § 9.
56. For a fine discussion and criticism of the "constructive notice" doc-
trine, see Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the
Ultra Vires Doctrine, 36 Yale L. J. 297, 326 (1927), where it is suggested that
an express provision, such as Section 11, should be adopted. See also 10 Corn.
L. Q. 498 (1925); 9 U.L.A. 55 (Perm. ed. 1932). Commissioners' Notes to cor-
responding Section 10 of the Uniform Business Corporation Act.
57. Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman Car Co., 139 U.S. 24, 11 S.Ct.
478, 35 L. Ed. 55 (1891).
58. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 12, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1092, I]. See 9 U.L.A.
57-62 (Perm. ed. 1932) for discussion of similar provisions in the Uniform
Business Corporation Act.
59. For a discussion of implied and incidental powers see State v. New
Orleans Warehouse Co., 109 La. 64, 33 So. 81 (1902), where it was held that
a railroad company might lease the second floor of its depot building to a
warehouse company since: (1) it could not be expected to allow the upper
floor to be idle, and (2) the presence of a warehouse at the station would
promote the convenience of shipping and so could be classed as fairly inci-
dental to the railway business.
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This is in line with the majority view of our state courts: that the
corporation's ultra vires acts are unauthorized only,60 and may
under certain circumstances give rise to corporate liability.
Professor Ballantine has criticized a similar provision for its
failure to go further and point out the specific consequences of
unauthorized action.0 1 The drafters of the Uniform Business Cor-
poration Act considered this possibility, but wisely concluded that
the many varying factors involved made it unwise to adopt a rigid
statutory rule as to when collateral attack upon the corporate
authority should be permitted.6 2 Section 12 is declaratory of the
majority state view, as to the nature and effects of ultra vires
acts, and ample authority for its construction is furnished by the
decided cases. Little doubt exists as to the right of a stockholder
to enjoin ultra vires action,68 as to the liability of a corporation
for torts committed in the course of an ultra vires transaction,"'
or as to rights acquired under fully performed ultra vires con-
tracts. 5 At the other extreme is the purely executory contract,
which will and should be held unenforceable; for the right of the
shareholder to insist that corporate resources shall be used only
for the purposes stated in the articles, or incidental thereto, is
more important than the right of third persons to insist upon
60. Bissel v. Michigan S. & N. R.R., 22 N.Y. 258 (1860).
61. Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act
(1934) U. of Chi. L. Rev. 357, 381-383; Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Draft-
ing a Modern Corporation Law (1931) 19 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 473-475.
62. "The variety of the circumstances from which ratification, estoppel,
negligence or laches may be inferred is so infinite that it would be unwise
to attempt to formulate a statutory rule to control the decisions upon this
aspect of the ultra vires problem. The principles now exist in the common
law and are being satisfactorily applied to cases of ultra vires corporate
action." Commissioners' Notes to the Uniform Business Corporation Act, 9
U.L.A. 61 (Perm. ed. 1932).
For an interesting and novel discussion of the ultra vires problem, see
Stone, Ultra Vires and Original Sin (1940) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 190, with a com-
plete bibliography of other writings at 199, n. 28.
63. The shareholder can enjoin ultra vires action, even though advan-
tageous. Coleman v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 10 Beav. 1 (1846). The right to
question and enjoin ultra vires action is limited to the State or someone (as
a shareholder) directly interested in the corporation. Nelson v. Texas & Pa-
cific Ry., 152 La. 117, 92 So. 754 (1922).
64. Chamberlain v. Southern California Edison Co., 167 Cal. 500, 140 Pac.
25 (1914).
65. Where a contract has been fully performed on both sides, neither
party can get it set aside and recover the consideration paid. Relmann v.
New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 191 La. 1079, 187 So. 30 (1939), discussed
with citation of other authorities, Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court
(1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 31, 128.
Also, a party who has received full performance is estopped to raise the
defense of ultra vires to an action on the contract. Bath Gas Light Co. v.
Claffy, 151 N.Y. 24, 45 N.E. 390 (1896).
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performance of such contracts.66 There will still be a somewhat
nebulous zone occupied by the partially executed ultra vires
agreement.
Although Section 12, I, broadly declares that the corporation
"shall have the capacity to act possessed by natural persons," our
courts will probably continue to apply the general rule that a
corporation has no power to enter into a partnership, unless the
authority is expressly conferred.17 This rule is bottomed on the
fundamental policy that the corporation should act through its
board of directors. The partnership arrangement, where each
member binds the firm when acting within the scope of the under-
taking, involves too great a delegation of the powers of manage-
ment. The Louisiana Act embodies the principle of director
management, 8 and the broad statement of Section 12, I, may well
be interpreted in the light of that concept. Of course, joint ven-
tures and other arrangements analogous to the partnership, but
where there is no yielding of the corporate management, will be
considered intra vires69
Subsection II of Section 12 specifically enumerates a num-
ber of things that a corporation is authorized to do. This subsec-
tion is prefaced by the important qualification, "Without limiting
or enlarging the grant of authority contained in subdivision I."
Thus, all such authorizations are subject to the general limitation
that the acts done must be in furtherance of or incidental to the
corporate purpose. Also, the enumeration is not exclusive, and
acts not included therein may come within the general grant of
authority set out in subsection I. The specific provisions of sub-
section II, however, will prove very valuable-indicating the gen-
eral types of permissible corporate activity and clearing up a few
uncertainties in the common law.
7
1
66. See Rutledge, supra note 39, at 319, 320, for an analysis of the Cali-
fornia statute, presumably drafted by Professor Ballantine, which abolishes
the defense of ultra vires as between the corporation and third parties or
shareholders.
67. Mallory v. Hananer Oil-Works, 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S.W. 396 (1888); 6 Flet-
cher, Corporations, 243, § 2520. However, where the partnership arrangement
has been in operation and losses suffered, the individual partner is estopped
to set up the ultra vires nature of the contract in an effort to escape his
share of the losses. J. P. Barnett Co. v. Ludeau, 171 La. 21, 129 So. 655 (1930).
68. Act 250 of 1928, § 34, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1114, I].
69. L. J. Mestier & Co. v. Chevalier Pavement Co., 108 La. 562, 568, 32
So. 520, 522 (1901); Nicholls, C. J., declared: "True, this corporation could
not be a member of a partnership. It had no such power, yet it could bind
itself to the extent of dividing profits as a consideration for advances made,
as we understand was done in this case." For further authority see 6 Flet-
cher, Corporations, 245, 247, § 2520.
70. Compare the less comprehensive provision of the Uniform Business
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Clauses (c) and (f) of Section 12, II, recognize the funda-
mental rights of a corporation to sue or be sued in the corporate
name, and to transact corporate business. It has been held that
non-payment of its annual franchise tax does not preclude a do-
mestic corporation from bringing suit or from continuing to con-
duct business in the state.71
Clause (e) clears up any doubt that may have existed as to
the authority of a corporation to subscribe for or purchase shares
of stock in another corporation. When read in connection with the
limitation in subsection I, it may be regarded as merely a codifi-
cation of the general common law rule that a corporation may
purchase stock in furtherance of its corporate purposes, express,
incidental, and implied.7 2 This clause, thus construed, does not
permit a corporation to engage indirectly in ultra vires activity
through the ownership of stock in other corporations having dis-
similar purposes, but does recognize the right of a corporation to
carry on its authorized business by means of subsidiary corpora-
tions. The corporation is given the full right to vote the shares
purchased, and thus may exercise a legitimate control of its sub-
sidiaries. 18 Also the suggestion has been made that "the taking of
stock as security for or in payment of a debt, and the investment
of idle funds in the stock or securities of other corporations would
be in furtherance of its corporate purposes."'7'
Corporation Act, § 11, II, 9 U.L.A. 56 (Perm. ed. 1932). Clauses e, g, h, I, j,
and k of the Louisiana Act, § 12, II, are not found in the Uniform Act.
71. Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Jones, 188 La. 519, 177 So. 593
(1937), applying Section 12, II(c), (f), of the Louisiana Business Corporation
Act. Odom, J., held (188 La. 519, 526, 177 So. 593, 595) that the statute levy-
ing an annual franchise tax on domestic corporations did not state or Inti-
mate "that the payment of the tax is a condition precedent to the corpora-
tion's engaging or continuing to engage in business," but was "a revenue act
pure and simple." Accord: Natchitoches Finance Co. v. Smith, 175 So. 915
(La. App. 1937).
A different result has been reached as to foreign corporations "doing
business in this state." They are precluded by La. Act 8 of 1935 (3 E. S.)
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1247.1] from bringing suit unless all taxes and licenses
are paid. R. J. Brown Co. v. Grosjean, 189 La. 778, 180 So. 634 (1938), discussed,
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW RDvmw 314,
406.
72. Professor Ballantine, after summarizing the general state of the com-
mon law authorities, concludes, "It would seem wise to give a corporation
express power to hold stock in other corporations and not trust to the im-
plication of such power where it may be incidental to the general objects."
Ballantine, Private Corporations (1927) 221.
73. Under La. Act 267 of 1914, § 7(j), a corporation could not vote over
10% of the capital stock in another corporation.
74. Commissioners' Notes to Section 12 of Uniform Business Corporation
Act, 9 U.L.A. 63 (Perm. ed. 1932).
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Clause (h) authorizes the corporation to borrow money and
to issue bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness, and to
secure the same by a mortgage, pledge or hypothecation of any
kind of corporate property. There is no limitation upon the
amount of indebtedness that may be incurred, nor is the consent
of the shareholders necessary to authorize long term indebted-
nesses. The absence of such restrictions in the Louisiana Act and
in other modern corporation statutes has been mildly criticized
by one writer, who suggests that the total amount of corporate
debts should bear some specific relation to the issued capital stock
in order that "the corporate shoestring should not be too short.""5
Clause (j) grants authority to guarantee the shares, bonds,
contracts and other obligations (including interest and dividends
thereon) of other corporations, domestic and foreign. Out of abun-
dant caution, the drafters of the Act expressly stipulated that this
authority to guarantee obligations of other corporations could
be exercised only "to accomplish its purposes as stated in the
articles." This restrictive clause is unnecessary, since all enumera-
tions of authority contained in subsection II are subject to the
corporate purpose limitation of subsection I. The provision does,
however, indicate a clear intention that the clause should be re-
garded merely as a codification of the general rule that a corpora-
tion may bind itself as surety or guarantor where there is a fairly
clear and direct connection with the promotion of the authorized
business of the corporation.76 In Cook v. Ruston Oil Mills & Ferti-
lizer Co.7 7 the Louisiana Supreme Court held a hardware com-
pany liable as indemnitor of the surety on a contractor's bond.
In overruling the defense of ultra vires, Justice Rogers stated the
general proposition that a trading corporation may guarantee its
customer's obligations, and pointed out that in the instant case
the hardware company stood to benefit by the builder's contract
through the sale of supplies and materials.
SHARES OF STOCK-CLASSIFICATION AND PREFERENCES
The proprietary interest in the corporation is represented by
shares of stock. These shares, evidencing the undivided interest
75. Rutledge, supra note 39, at 323.
76. 6 Fletcher, Corporations, 379, § 2591.
77. 170 La. 10, 127 So. 347 (1930), the court also used the familiar "estop-
pel" argument. The earlier case of Robert Gair Co. v. Columbia Rice Pack-
ing Co., 124 La. 193, 50 So. 8 (1909), was virtually overruled, but was dis-
tinguished on the ground that the benefit to the guaranteeing corporation
was not so direct and clear as in the case at bar.
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of the owner or "shareholder," may be divided into classes with
or without par value, and with such preferences, rights, or restric-
tions as are provided for in the articles. Section 1378 deals with
the classification and designations of shares, and subsection III is
significant. It declares the general rule that, "Except as otherwise
provided in the articles and referred to in the certificate of stock,
each share shall be in all respects equal to every other share."
Where the articles are not fully explicit, we must look to the
case law to determine the extent of the "preferred" shareholder's
rights, always bearing in mind that he has only those preferences
which are expressly stated or may be reasonably implied from his
contract. For example, stock with a preference as to dividends is
not entitled to priority in the distribution of assets on dissolution,
unless such right is expressly stipulated in the articles.
There is still considerable conflict as to whether shareholders
with a preferential dividend right are, when the corporate ven-
ture proves very profitable, entitled to an additional share in the
surplus available for dividend distribution. The preferred share-
holder is given a security of income return not enjoyed by share-
holders of the common variety. If the enterprise meets with only
indifferent success, the preferred shareholder may receive divi-
dends, while the common shareholder gets nothing. It is logical to
conclude that the security of the preferential rate was accepted in
lieu of equal participation in profits. Thus, the better view, prob-
ably representing the weight of authority, is that the preferred
shareholder should receive only the stipulated dividend, with the
entire balance being distributed among the common sharehold-
ers.79 Other courts have held that after the common shareholders
have been paid a dividend equal to the preferential dividend, the
preferred shareholders are entitled to share equally with the
common shareholders in any further profits available for divi-
dends. 10 No Louisiana decisions on this point have been found. If
the incorporators desire that the common shareholders, who as-
sume the greater risk, should get the extra profits if the business
is exceptionally successful, they should make this definite, and
expressly stipulate that the preferred shareholder shall get a cer-
78. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 13 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1093].
79. Powers Foundry Co. v. Miller, 166 Md. 590, 171 Atl. 842 (1934); Niles
v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co., 202 Fed. 141 (C.C.A. 2d, 1913), affirming 196 Fed.
994 (1912); Will v. United Lankat Plantation Co., 1914 A.C. 11, 83 L.J. Ch.
(N.S.) 195, 109 L.T. (N.S.) 754 (1914). For a full review and discussion of
decisions in point, see Note (1921) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 463-486.
80. Sternbergh v. Brock, 225 Pa. 279, 74 Atl. 166 (1909).
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tain percentage "and no more."81 Conversely, they should specific-
ally state that the preferred shareholders are to share equally in
additional profits, if such is their intention.
SHARE CERTIFICATES
The certificate of stock is prima facie evidence both of the
validity of the issue of stock and of the ownership of the person
named therein."2 Section 2188 was inserted to dovetail the Business
Corporation Act into, and to focus attention upon, the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, which was adopted by Louisiana in 1910.4
Under this statute a transfer of the certificate, properly indorsed,
operates as a transfer of the shares of stock to a bona fide pur-
chaser. By it the share of stock is given full attributes of negotia-
bility, and the certificate, when indorsed in blank by the owner,
passes freely from hand to hand in the same manner as a check
similarly indorsed. 5 A share of stock may change hands several
times, merely on the blank indorsement of the registered owner,
until eventually a holder decides to have the old certificate can-
celled and a new one issued in his name. In the meantime, the
corporation, in the absence of notice to the contrary, may safely
rely on its books and allow voting rights or send dividend checks
to the registered owner.8 6
The form and contents of the certificate is set out in Section
14.8? Subsection II declares what must be stated in the certificate
81. Tennant v. Epstein, 356 Ill. 26, 189 N.E. 864 (1934), noted (1934) 83 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 91.
82. Davidson v. American Paper Mfg. Co., 188 La. 69, 175 So. 753 (1937).
La. Act 250 of 1928, § 1, VIII [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1080, VIII].
Where a certificate of stock has been fraudulently issued to another, the
true owner can secure a cancellation of such certificate and compel the
Issuance of a new certificate to him. McWilliams v. Geddes & Moss Under-
taking Co., 169 So. 894 (La. App. 1936). McCaleb, J. (169 So. 894, 896) quotes
from Succession of McGuire, 151 La. 514, 520, 92 So. 40, 42 (1922), as follows:
"'From the foregoing it is very plain that a certificate of stock is merely a
paper evidence created for convenience, of the ownership of the share of
stock; . . .that the thing which is in reality the subject of ownership is the
share of stock itself.'"
83. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 21 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1101].
84. La. Act 180 of 1910 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1180-1205]. Space does not
permit a full discussion of the problems arising under this statute.
85. "The elements of negotiability lacking at the common law, have now
been supplied by the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and a stock certificate in-
dorsed In blank passes freely and becomes a 'courier without luggage whose
countenance is its passport.'" Note (1939) 4 Univ. of Newark L.R. 220, 221.
See also Note (1939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 480.
86. For a complete discussion of problems arising out of the negotiability
of the stock certificate, see Dewey, Transfer Agent's Dilemma-Conflicting
Claims to Share of Stock (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 553.
87. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 14 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1094]. The certificate
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and should be carefully complied with. Where shares of more
than one class are authorized, the certificate must recite "the
rights, voting powers, preferences and restrictions granted to or
imposed upon the shares of each class, or a reference to the
articles relating thereto." This enables the shareholder to acquire
easily an adequate idea of the relative position of his stock in the
corporate structure. Subsection III follows the general practice of
prohibiting the expression of any nominal or par value on cer-
tificates for no-par stock.88 However, the certificate may state a
fixed amount at which these shares may be redeemed, or it may
contain such statements as may be desired concerning the share-
holder's interest in the event of dissolution. It is believed that
such statements are "no indication or false representation as to
what has been paid to the corporation upon those shares."8
ALLOTMENT AND CONSIDERATION FOR SHARES
A subscriber does not become a shareholder until allotment of
shares to him, usually by the board of directors in response to the
application contained in his subscription." An exception is made
in the case of pre-incorporation subscriptions, which are auto-
matically accepted, and the subscriber becomes a shareholder
coincident with incorporation.91
While Section 15 provides that subscriptions for shares may
be made payable with cash, property, or services,"2 it expressly
prohibits the issuance of shares having a par value at less than
the full par value in cash or other property fairly valued.99 This
does not prevent the issuance of shares to an underwriter at less
than par. The underwriter's discount is really a commission, and
must be signed by the president and secretary, or by such other officers of
the corporation as the articles or by-laws may provide. Id. at subsection I.
88. The spirit of the provision "is to eliminate misrepresentation arising
from a difference between a value appearing upon the face of the certificate
and the actual value of the divisional interest in corporate assets to which
the certificate represents the holder to be entitled." Commissioners' Notes to
a substantially identical prohibition in Section 14 of the Uniform Business
Corporation Act, 9 U.L.A. 65 (Perm. ed. 1932).
89. Commissioners' Notes, 9 U.L.A. 65 (Perm. ed. 1932).
90. See La. Act 250 of 1928, § 1, IX [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1080, IX]. The
word "allot" was adopted (Section 1, IX) to express the act of the corporation
in accepting the subscriber's subscription and making him a shareholder.
When the shares are paid for the certificate is "issued." Commissioners' Notes
to the Uniform Corporation Act, 9 U.L.A 69 (Perm. ed. 1932).
91. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 1, IX, and § 6, III [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1080,
IX, § 1086, III].
92. Id. at § 15, II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1095, II].
93. Id. at § 15, III [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1095, III].
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may constitute a reasonable compensation (expressly authorized
in Section 7) for the risk taken in underwriting a bloc of stock."'
The character and value of consideration to be paid for no-par
stock is to be determined by the incorporators where the sub-
scription is signed before incorporation. The character and value
of the consideration for subsequent allotments is to be determined
by the shareholders, unless such authority is specially conferred
on the board of directors by the shareholders or the articles.95
Thus, unless the power is delegated to the directors, new mem-
bers cannot come into the enterprise, except by contributing such
sums or value as the existing shareholders determine is a fair
consideration for the participating rights in assets and profits
which they will acquire.
Par value shares are sometimes sold at a premium. The con-
flict at common law96 as to how such premiums should be treated
has been removed by the Louisiana Act. Only the par value is to
be considered as "capital stock,' '9 7 and the remainder is paid in
"surplus,"9 8 out of which dividends may be paid. 9
Ordinarily sound financing does not permit the treatment of
any part of the consideration received for no-par shares as paid-in
surplus. Such procedure would make any consideration so re-
ceived available for the payment of unearned dividends. In cer-
tain cases, however, this practice may be desirable. For instance,
in the reorganization of a corporation having a surplus, it is neces-
sary to tag and set aside that surplus. Otherwise, the common
stock of the new corporation will automatically soak it up in the
capital account and make it unavailable for dividend purposes.10
94. Id. at § 7 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 10871 provides that "A corporation
may .. . pay or allow reasonable compensation for the sale or underwriting
at the time of organization or thereafter of its shares, or any part thereof."
See also In re Licensed Victuallers Mutual Trading Ass'n, 42 Ch. 1 (C.A. 1899).
95. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 15, IV [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1095, IV]. For a
comprehensive recent discussion of the problem of consideration for no-par
shares, see Masterson, Consideration for Non-Par Shares and Liability of
Subscribers and Stockholders (1939) 17 Tex. L. Rev. 247.
96. There was a conflict in the decisions. Some courts held that where par
value stock sold at a premium, the entire amount received must be con-
sidered as "capital stock" and was thus unavailable for dividends. Merchants'
& Insurers' Reporting Co. v. Youtz, 39 Cal. App. 226, 178 Pac. 540 (1918).
Others held that such premiums should be treated as paid-in surplus from
which dividends may be paid. Equitable Life Assur. Society v. Union Pacific
R.R., 212 N.Y. 360, 106 N.E. 92 (1914).
97. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 1, X(a) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1080, X(a)].
98. Id. at § 1, XIII [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1080, XIII].
99. Id. at § 26, II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1106, II].
100. See Berle, Problems of Non-Par Stock (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 43, 49.
1940]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. II
Section 25 101 authorizes those charged with the valuation of con-
sideration received for no-par shares to "at that time specify" an
amount of such value that is to be treated as surplus. This broad
grant of authority may be abused by promoters intending to buoy
the faith of investors through the subsequent payment of un-
earned dividends.
Section 16, subsection 1,102 following an express mandate of
the Louisiana Constitution,0 3 prohibits the issuance of a certifi-
cate of stock "until the shares represented thereby have been
fully paid for." Thus, the share certificate cannot be issued in
payment for services yet to be rendered, or property yet to be
received.10 4 This restriction is necessitated by the negotiable quali-
ties of the certificate. It does not prevent a subscriber from imme-
diately becoming a shareholder upon the allotment of his shares,
but does prohibit the issuance of a certificate to him until the
shares are fully paid for.0 5 Subsection II eliminates any possible
uncertainties as to the effect of payment by promissory note or
check. Adopting the Louisiana rule'0 6 (which is generally re-
garded as the preferable one)1 07 this subsection specifically states
that shares allotted upon receipt of a shareholder's note or uncer-
tified check "shall not be considered as fully paid for until such
note or check has been paid."
The shareholder who honestly fulfills the terms of his sub-
scription is accorded full protection against any further liability
101. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 25 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1105]. A substantially
identical provision is found in the Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 23,
9 U.L.A. 74 (Perm. ed. 1932).
102. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 16, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1096, I].
103. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIII, § 2, provides, "Corporations shall not
issue stock or bonds except for labor done, or money or property actually
received; and all fictitious issues of stock shall be void; and any corporation
issuing such fictitious stock shall forfeit its charter."
104. In refusing specific performance of a contract by which a corpora-
tion was to issue shares in payment for services yet to be rendered, the
Louisiana Supreme Court declared, "'Labor done or.money or property ac-
tually received,' cannot possibly mean labor to be done or money or property
to be received." Lothrop v. Goudeau, 142 La. 342, 354, 76 So. 794, 798 (1917).
105. Shares are often allotted with the shareholder only paying $50.00(or some such amount) on each $100.00 par value share. The certificates of
stock are not issued and no attempt is made to represent the shares as fully
paid. The subscriber becomes a stockholder with the remaining $50.00 to be
paid upon a call by the board of directors, which may never be made if the
corporation does not need the additional money. Of course, if the corporation
runs into financial difficulties, the shareholder can be compelled to pay the
balance, so far as necessary to meet corporate debts.
106. State v. New Orleans Debenture Redemption Co., 51 La. Ann. 1827,
26 So. 586 (1899), holding that the giving of a promissory note was not a
sufficient compliance with a statutory requirement of "payment in cash."
107. 11 Fletcher, Corporations, 447, § 5195.
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to the corporation. Section 16, subsection III declares that his
shares shall be "fully paid" and "non-assessable." Section 1708
provides that, for the purpose of determining whether shares have
been fully paid for, the valuation placed upon consideration other
than cash by the incorporators, shareholders or directors, as the
case may be, shall be conclusive. Section 19, subsection 11 states
that a shareholder who complies with the terms of his subscrip-
tion shall be under no further liability to the corporation with
regard to his shares.
Subsection II of Section 19 states the general rule that a
shareholder is not personally liable for debts of the corporation.1 1
This, and the above provisions, might be interpreted as expressing
a legislative intent that the shareholder who innocently takes
shares for over-valued services or property is completely pro-
tected. There is, however, a serious doubt as to the constitution-
ality of so broad a grant of immunity.". Then too, 'Sections 17
and 19, I, specifically refer to liability "to the corporation," and it
is consistent with a general policy of protecting corporate credi-
tors that these words of the Act should be construed to mean
what they say, and nothing more. Third persons dealing with a
corporation have a right to expect that when stock has been
issued as paid up, full value in money or property has gone into
the corporate coffers.
Subsection III expressly preserves any rights which the cor-
poration or any person may have because of fraud practiced by
108. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 17 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1097]. Also conclusive
is Section 17(b) "the valuation placed by the board of directors upon the
corporate assets in estimating the surplus to be transferred to capital as
payment for shares to be allotted as stock dividends."
109. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 19, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1099, I].
110. Sutton v. Moreland, 177 So. 396 (La. App. 1937) (shareholders are
not personally liable on an agreement executed by them as agents for the
corporation).
111. Such a provision must be construed in the light of Art. XIII, § 2, of
the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, supra note 103. In Rapides Grocery Co.
v. Grant, 165 La. 593, 599, 115 So. 791, 793-794 (1928), the Louisiana Supreme
Court unqualifiedly declared that "under said article, the value of property
or labor received in payment of a stock subscription must be equal to the
face value of the shares, and the subscriber is liable to the creditors of the
insolvent corporation for the difference between the value of the property
given in payment and the par value of the shares." Accord: Webre v. Christ,
130 La. 450, 58 So. 145, (1912). Cf. Walmsley v. Brothers, 152 La. 148, 92 So.
766 (1922), where the court refused to hold a shareholder liable to the re-
ceiver of a failing corporation for the difference between the rather nominal
actual value of services rendered and the par value of stock received. O'Niell,
J., emphasized the facts that no bad faith was shown, and that there was
no affirmative showing that credit had been extended on the strength of any
one's faith in the ostensible paid-in capital.
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an incorporator, director, officer or shareholder. Both creditors
and the corporation have a clear cause of action against the share-
holder who knowingly participated in a stock-watering scheme
by paying for his shares with property at an over-valuation."'
In cases of gross over-valuation of property or services taken
in payment for shares, Section 20 declares"2 that the incorpora-
tors, shareholders, or directors (depending upon which is charged
with the duty of evaluation) who knowingly or without reason-
able care and inquiry, consented to or voted in favor thereof shall
be jointly and severally liable'" to the corporation, for the benefit
of shareholders and creditors. A shareholder, director or incorpo-
rator who was present at the meeting where the evaluation was
made is presumed to have consented thereto, unless his dissent
was promptly filed in the registered office of the corporation."'
In many instances a large part of a corporation's capital is
secured through the sale of no-par stock. Often shares are issued
for consideration other than cash. It is therefore important that
prospective investors and creditors should be able to obtain full
and accurate information upon which to determine a corporation's
financial status. This is the basic policy behind the requirement in
Section 18116 that a full and verified report of the share structure
and the consideration received for shares must be filed with the
Recorder of Mortgages and the Secretary of State within ninety
days after incorporation. This report must include a descriptive
statement of the amount and designations of the various classes
112. In Dilzell Engineering & Constr. Co. v. Lehmann, 120 La. 273, 45 So.
138 (1907), the defendants, managing the affairs of a corporation, had dis-
tributed stock with a face value of $30,100.00 among themselves, and had
given in return a worthless lease acquired by one of their number for about
$600.00. They were held liable to corporate creditors for the difference be-
tween the value of the property transferred and the face value of the shares
received. Provosty, J., relied on Art. 13, § 2, of the Louisiana Constitution of
1921 (Art. 266 of La. Const. of 1898) and declared, "While it is not here said
expressly that the value of the labor or property received in payment of the
stock must be equal to the face value of the stock, that is the idea meant
to be conveyed." (120 La. 273, 284, 45 So. 138, 142).
113. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 20, II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1100, II. Subsec-
tion I provides joint and several liability for any incorporator, officer, or
director who knowingly or negligently consents to or participates in an un-
lawful allotment of shares, the illegal issuance of a stock certificate, the
making of a false statement in any document, or the omission to file any
required statement or document.
114. The corporation need not sue all those charged with liability, and it
may not be worth while to join those without leviable assets. Joint and sev-
eral liability is one and the same thing as liability in solido. Garland v. Coreil,
17 La. App. 17, 134 So. 297 (1931).
115. La; Act 250 of 1928, § 20, III [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1100, III].
116. Id. at § 18 (Dart's Stats. (1939) § 10981.
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of shares which may be issued, and which actually have been
allotted. It must state the amount of cash, or a fair general de-
scription and the value placed on consideration other than cash,
which was received in payment for shares allotted. Supplemental
reports must be filed after each subsequent allotment of shares
not payable in cash, or of those payable in cash at a different
price from shares previously sold. In addition to the joint and
several liability of corporate officers to anyone suffering a loss
because of their failure to file the required report,117 the section
imposes a fine, not exceeding $500, on the corporation.118
POWER OF CORPORATION TO REPURCHASE SHARES AND TO ISSUE
CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES
Section 23 adopts the prevailing rule that a corporation may
purchase its own shares "only out of surplus available for divi-
dends." ' 9 This limitation on the power to repurchase is postulated
on the idea that the capital stock is in the nature of a "trust fund"
for the security of creditors, and represents money or property
actually and permanently devoted to the corporate enterprise.
The exercise of an unlimited power to repurchase might effect a
serious impairment of the actual working capital of the corpora-
tion, with a consequent reduction of the creditor's margin of
security. This follows through to the proverbially absurd, yet
nevertheless possible, conclusion that if a corporation without
any surplus repurchased most of its stock, the actual capital in-
vestment would vanish, and its treasury would be filled with
cancelled certificates. 20
Except in certain specified instances, stock repurchases must
be authorized by a two-thirds vote of each class of shares out-
standing.121 Shares thus acquired become "treasury shares" until
117. Id. at § 20, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1110, I]. See note 113, supra.
118. Id. at § 18, IV [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1098, IV].
119. For a fine collection of statutes and cases in accord, see Comment
(1938) 27 Geo. L. J. 217, 220-223. California and Illinois go even further and
restrict such purchases to earned surplus. Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1931) §
347; Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 32, § 157.58.
Where there is an agreement by a corporation to purchase its own shares,
with payment deferred, the financial condition of the corporation at the time
of payment is controlling. Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F. (2d) 756 (C.C.A.
5th, 1935); In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (C.C.A. 2d, 1914).
120. For a good criticism and discussion of the results of giving a corpo-
ration unlimited authority to repurchase its shares, see Nussbaum, Acquisi-
tion by a Corporation of Its Own Stock (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 971; Rutledge,
supra note 39 at 322, n. 72, collects a number of other authorities adopting a
similar view.
121. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 23, I(e) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1103, I(e)]. Such
authority by shareholder vote is not required where the articles provide for
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disposed of by sale or formal reduction of the capital stock. 2'
Unless the articles require cancellation, these treasury shares may
be reissued and sold for such consideration as the board of direc-
tors may fix, but not for less than the price at which they were
purchased. 12 3 If it is desired to cancel the purchased shares, the
procedure for reduction of capital stock, set forth in Section 45,
subsection IX, must be followed. 12 4 The necessity of a strict and
prompt compliance with the requirements of Section 45, where a
reduction of the corporation's capital stock is intended, was forci-
bly illustrated by the recent case of State v. Stewart Brothers
Cotton Co., Inc.125 In that case a corporation repurchased a third
of its outstanding shares, intending to cancel the same and reduce
the capital stock accordingly. However, a formal amendment of
the articles was not passed or filed until three years later. The
Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the general view that treasury
shares are "outstanding" for taxation purposes until they are for-
mally retired, and held that the corporation must pay a franchise
tax upon the repurchased shares for the three years prior to the
amendment of the articles effecting their cancellation.
Section 24126 broadly provides that a corporation shall have
authority to issue stock or securities convertible into "shares of
any class or classes." Thus, preferred stock may be issued which
the holder may at his option convert into common stock. This
provision does not authorize agreements for the conversion of
stock into bonds. Such a conversion would decrease the capital
stock of the corporation and lessen the security of corporate
creditors, for bondholders are themselves creditors rather than
permanent investors in the corporate business. 2 7 It does, how-
ever, authorize the issuance of bonds convertible into shares of
redemption of shares, when such purchase is in the good faith collection or
compromise of a debt, when the purchase is for the purpose of resale or
allotment to employees, or when it is pursuant to a repurchase agreement
with employees. Id. at § 23, I(a)-(d) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1103 I(a)-(d)].
122. Id. at § 23, II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1103, II].
123. Id. at § 23, III [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1103, III].
124. Opinions of Attorney General, 1932-34, p. 193.
125. 193 La. 16, 190 So. 317 (1939); Discussed, Work of Louisiana Supreme
Court (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 31, 128.
126. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 24, I(a) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1104, I(a)]. For
a discussion of conversion privileges, see 11 Fletcher, Corporations, 752, § 5306.
127. A Kentucky statute authorizing the issuance of preferred stock con-
vertible into bonds has been interpreted in such a way that preferred share-
holders exercising the privilege did not secure priority over or even equality
with corporate creditors. In re Phoenix Hotel Co. of Lexington, 13 F. Supp.
229 (1935), affirmed 83 F. (2d) 724 (C.C.A. 6th, 1936).
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stock.12 Such a privilege often makes the bonds of a new corpo-
ration very attractive. While the future of the corporate venture
is still uncertain, the purchaser may retain his more secure status
of a bondholder; but if the corporation proves successful, he may
choose to relinquish that security and receive the greater income
of a shareholder. Subsection IV requires that where shares upon
which conversion rights are granted have a par value the conver-
sion must be on a basis of not less than the par value of such
shares. This forestalls any attempts to sell stock below par
through the device of issuing sub-par bonds convertible into
stock at their par value.
The issuance of stock purchase warrants, a practice which
has only recently come into frequent use, is also authorized by
Section 24.129 These warrants may be issued in connection with
the sale of stock or bonds. They are transferable and give the
holder an option, at such future time and at such a price as is
stipulated, to purchase stock (usually common) in the corpora-
tion. Thus, the cautious investor, who buys bonds or preferred
stock, secures the additional privilege of coming in as a common
shareholder, if and when the corporate business becomes well
established. There are definite drawbacks to the free issuance of
such warrants. They naturally tend to retard the advance of the
common stock in the open market. Then too, the option is nor-
mally exercised at a time when the corporation is in good shape
and either does not need additional capital or else could secure it
more advantageously by other means. The option warrant is es-
sentially an emergency measure, to be used as an added induce-
ment when the corporation is having difficulty in securing needed
funds.
DIVIDENDS
It is axiomatic in sound corporate finance that the assets
which represent the capital investment in the corporation should
be used but not used up. This fundamental idea of keeping the
capital investment intact is embodied in the general rule of Sec-
128. It is expressly provided that conversion rights may be granted in
connection with the sale of "any stock and/or securities." For a full discus-
sion of bonds convertible into stock and the interpretation of such conversion
agreements, see 6 Fletcher, Corporations, 540, §§ 2692-2695.
129. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 24, I(b) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1103, I(b)]. The
device was used in 1872 as a part of the financing of the Illinois Central
Railroad, but "had its great vogue in the boom stock market years of 1925-
1929, when the investing public was 'common stock conscious.'" 19 Fletcher,
Corporations, 63, § 8907.
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tion 26130 that dividends may be paid only out of some form of ac-
tual surplus. Subsection I provides the formula--"No corporation
shall pay dividends in cash or property, except from the surplus
of the aggregate of its assets over the aggregate of its liabilities,
plus the amount of its capital stock."'113 Further, the payment
of such dividends out of a surplus arising from any sort of unreal-
ized profits or appreciation of assets is expressly prohibited." 2
Cash or property dividends may be paid out of "paid-in surplus,"
but notice regarding the source must be given to the recipient
shareholders. s3
Subsection III permits the payment of a stock dividend"" out
of a surplus including those unrealized profits and unrealized ap-
preciation items which are excluded from consideration when
cash dividends are involved. The declaration of stock dividends is
subject to two significant limitations, set out in subsection V. Par
value shares must not be issued unless a corresponding amount of
surplus is transferred to capital, thus forestalling the possibility
of a stock-watering dividend. Also, where shareholders of one
class receive shares of another class as a dividend, such payment
must be authorized by a majority vote of shareholders of the
latter class, whose relative voting rights will be affected.
In computing the aggregate of the corporate assets for pur-
poses of dividends, whether payable in cash or shares, proper
allowance must be made for depreciation, depletion, and known
losses of every character. 135 There are certain so-called "wasting
assets" corporations, which, by their very nature, consume and
exhaust their principal assets in normal operation. For example,
the oil wells, coal mines, leases, or patents which may constitute
the most valuable assets of oil, mining or manufacturing com-
panies, have only a limited life. There has been some conflict as
to whether such a corporation is subject to the general rule, and
must set up a reserve to replace capital deficiencies before declar-
ing dividends out of current profits.' Subsection VI of Section 26
130. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 26 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1106].
131. For definitions see id. at § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1080] X (capital
stock), XII (assets), XIII (surplus).
132. Id. at § 26, I(b) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1106, I(b)].
133. Id. at § 26, II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1106, II].
134. The taxability of stock dividends is discussed by James, The Present
Status of Stock Dividends under the Sixteenth Amendment (1939) 6 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 215.
135. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 26, IV [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1106, IV].
136. In Wittenberg v. Federal Mining & Smelting Co., 15 Del. Ch. 147, 133
Atl. 48 (1926), the court enjoined payment of dividends on common stock
without setting up a "wasting assets" reserve to insure repayment of princi-
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authorizes such payment out of net profits only "if the articles so
provide."''1 7 Even when specifically provided for, such authority is,
by a concluding proviso of the subsection, "subject, however, to
the rights of shareholders of different classes." It follows that, if
there are common shares and shares preferred as to principal, a
sufficient reserve must be maintained to insure the repayment of
principal to the holders of the preferred shares. Nice problems
may also arise in the determination of what property constitutes
"wasting assets." Oil wells, coal or ore mines, leases and patents
are expressly included. They are usually acquired for the sole
purpose of being worked and consumed. On the other hand, it has
been held that oil in the tanks at the formation of a corporation,
and figuring as part of its capital assets, is subject to the general
rule, and that the proceeds of its sale could not lawfully be dis-
tributed as dividends.18
Dividends are formally declared by the board of directors,
and the shareholder's legal right vests as of that time.13 9 The
declaration of dividends is a discretionary matter, and the direc-
tors may not deem it advisable to declare an immediate dividend,
even though a substantial surplus is available. In general, the
courts have adopted a hands-off policy and will not order the
declaration of a dividend, except where bad faith or an extreme
abuse of discretion is shown.1'40
pal to preferred shareholders. The decision has been criticized with contra
authority cited, Note (1926) 12 Corn. L. Q. 79; and approved, Note (1927) 75
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 350. The unsettled state of the law was recognized by the
drafters of the Uniform Act, 9 U.L.A. 76 (Perm, ed. 1932).
137. Corresponding Section 24, VII of the Uniform Business Corporation
Act, 9 U.L.A. 75 (Perm. ed. 1932), authorizes such payment of dividends from
net profits, without the necessity of a special provision in the articles.
138. Van Vleet v. Evangeline Oil Co., 129 La. 406, 56 So. 343 (1911), hold-
ing that the declaration of a dividend out of money received for oil placed
in tanks prior to formation of the company and constituting part of the
original capital, was gross mismanagement and necessitated the appointment
of a receiver. In discussing the "wasting assets" doctrine, Judge Sommerville
distinguished the oil in question from oil wells and mines which are owned
for the express purpose of being worked, and of necessity become exhausted
in the profit-making process.
139. After a cash dividend is declared, the shareholder becomes a credi-
tor of the corporation for the amount of his dividend. However, prescription
does not begin to run until there has been a demand and refusal. Armant v.
New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 41 La. Ann. 1020, 7 So. 35 (1889). See Com-
ment, When Do Dividends Vest? (1938) 27 Geo. L. J. 74.
Informal divisions of profits have been recognized where made in good
faith and no creditors' rights were impaired. See Note (1939) 18 Chi.-Kent
Rev. 93.
140. Crichton v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167, 36 So. 926 (1904), the court
ordered the declaration of a dividend where the directors of a corporation
with an enormous surplus refused to declare dividends in an obvious effort
to starve out minority shareholders. Accord: Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204
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Section 27141 sets forth the liability of directors and sharehold-
ers for dividends unlawfully paid or corporate assets otherwise
unlawfully returned. Under subsection I, only those directors
who knowingly or negligently voted in favor of such unlawful
payments are made liable, and an express allegation of such
knowledge or lack of care is essential to a good cause of action.142
The liability of the directors is joint and several and exists in
favor of creditors of the corporation, rather than in favor of the
corporation itself as in the Uniform Act.143 This provision for
direct liability to creditors has the advantage of enabling a cred-
itor to obtain relief without resorting to the circuitous procedure
of first securing a judgment against the corporation and having it
returned unsatisfied. Also, the creditors are the ones primarily
affected by such unlawful payments and they will likely act more
promptly than those in charge of the corporation (who may be in
sympathy with, if not implicated in, the payment). Probably the
creditor's cause of action is for the full amount of the unlawful
payment, with any excess over his claim inuring to the benefit of
the corporation; for the liability is declared to be "in an amount
equal to the dividends so paid." It is also possible to so interpret
this provision as to make the amount of the suing creditor's claim
the outside measure of liability. Much can be said in favor of
those statutes which impose liability to the corporation and/or
Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). Cf. Marks v. American Brewing Co., 126 La.
666, 52 So. 983 (1910), where the court properly refused to order a dividend
declared.
141. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 27 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1107]. The provision
refers to dividends paid in violation of "Section 24," but should read "Section
26." This is evidently a clerical error brought about by the fact that the
provision is substantially taken from Section 25 of the Uniform Business
Corporation Act which properly refers to Section 24 of that Act.
142. Nola Lumber Co. v. Alexander, 182 La. 432, 162 So. 35 (1935). In hold-
ing that the petition stated no cause of action against the directors voting
in favor of an unlawful return of corporate assets to the shareholders, Rogers,
J., declared (182 La. 432, 437, 162 So. 35, 36), "Section 27 of Act No. 250 of
1928, on which plaintiff founds his cause of action, applies only to those
directors 'who knowingly, or without exercising that diligence, care and skill
which ordinarily prudent men in like positions would exercise under similar
conditions, voted in favor of' an unlawful distribution, payment, or return of
assets to shareholders. We think such an allegation is essential. Under sec-
tion 17 of Act No. 267 of 1914, liability attached to the director, who merely
assented to the act complained of, whether his assent was given knowingly
or innocently. But, when the subsequent corporation statute was drawn, the
lawmakers were careful to impose liability only on those directors who
knowingly or carelessly voted for the things set out in the statutory pro-
vision."
143. Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 25, I, 9 U.L.A. 77 (Perm. ed.
1932).
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creditors,"' thus making doubly certain the fact that the erring
directors will be held fully responsible.
Where the shareholder had actual knowledge of the impro-
priety of the dividend, he is liable to the corporation or its credi-
tors on the ground of fraud.14 5 Where the shareholder innocently
received the dividend or other unlawful distribution of corporate
capital, his position has been uncertain.'4 6 Subdivision II of Sec-
tion 27 clearly covers this situation. It provides for general share-
holder liability, but only: (1) where there are no guilty or negligent
directors; or (2) where directors are liable, to the extent that
the creditor is unable to obtain satisfaction after recovering a
judgment against the directors. The shareholder's liability ex-
pressly runs "to the corporation," rather than to creditors of the
corporation, as does the director's liability. Yet, there are certain
situations where, for very practical reasons, this proviso has been
held inapplicable.. In the case of Fudickar v. Inabnet 47 a corpora-
tion had been completely liquidated and its assets distributed
among the shareholders although its debts had not been paid. The
Louisiana Supreme Court allowed corporate creditors to proceed
directly against the shareholders to enforce their liability arising
out of the unlawful distribution. Then too, it has been suggested
that the cause of action against shareholders receiving unlawful
dividends or other disbursements may be availed of indirectly by
an unsatisfied judgment creditor, who may levy upon it as a cor-
porate asset.'"
Subsection III completes the picture, providing that "where
the directors are held liable for the sole reason of acting negli-
144. Modern corporation statutes vary considerably, both as to the extent
of liability and in whose favor the liability runs. 12 Fletcher, Corporations,
143, § 5432. At common law, directors were liable for a willful or negligent
declaration of an unlawful dividend "not only to the corporation, but also,
in equity, to creditors." Id. at 140, § 5431.
145. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 19, III [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1099, III] reserves
all existing causes of actions predicated upon fraud.
146. 12 Fletcher, Corporations, 129-131, § 5423.
147. 176 La. 777, 781, 146 So. 745, 746 (1933). Rogers, J., considered it "of
no importance here" that under Section 27 of the Louisiana Business Cor-
poration Act the stockholder's liability runs in favor of the corporation, since
the corporation had been liquidated and ceased to exist; and declared that
if, under the circumstances, the shareholders should not be held liable, "the
plaintiff occupies the anomalous position of the possessor of a right without
a remedy to enforce it." Accord: Derbes v. Till, 13 La. App. 495, 128 So. 196
(1930), where in allowing a direct action by creditors, Janvier, J., emphasized
the facts that the liquidation had been terminated and that there was no one
to bring suit for the corporation, and concluded (13 La. App. 495, 497, 128 So.
196, 198) "It therefore seems that the matter should be allowed to go to trial
'as a last report, and the only means of preventing a denial of justice.'"
148. 9 U.L.A. 77 (Perm. ed. 1932), Commissioners' Notes to corresponding
Section 25, II, of the Uniform Business Corporation Act.
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gently," they shall have a right of action over against each of the
shareholders in proportion to the amount such shareholder re-
ceived.
SHAREHOLDERS' PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS
The shareholder's preemptive right to subscribe for a pro-
portionate share of any further allotment of stock is a valuable
protection and enables him to maintain the existing ratio of his
proprietary interest and voting power in the corporation. 149 Where,
however, a new issue of stock is allotted for a purpose other than,
or in addition to, that of obtaining additional cash for working
capital, the shareholder's assertion of a preemptive right may
present serious difficulties. For example, the corporation may
need a tract of land which the owner proposes to trade for a cer-
tain number of shares. Naturally, existing shareholders cannot be
given the privilege of subscribing for a portion of this new allot-
ment of stock. Section 28150 of the Louisiana Business Corporation
Act expressly permits the articles to include any desired provi-
sions restricting or enlarging the preemptive right. But in the
absence of some contrary provision in the articles, subsection II
stipulates that the holders of voting shares shall have a preemp-
tive right to subscribe for a proportionate number of any further
allotment for cash of shares having voting rights. Following the
path indicated by judicial decision, the subsection declares that a
shareholder shall have no preemptive right to subscribe for
shares allotted for consideration other than cash, shares allotted
to satisfy conversion or option rights, or shares once allotted and
then subsequently held by the corporation as treasury shares.
Also, shares may be issued to corporate employees free from pre-
emptive rights upon the written consent or vote of the holders of
a majority of the shares entitled to exercise such rights. In cases
where the preemptive right exists, the shareholder is given "a
reasonable time to be fixed by the board of directors," to sub-
scribe for his proportion of the new stock. If he is unable to raise
sufficient funds, or for some other reason does not choose to take
up the shares, the right may be assigned or sold.-1 Where a share-
149. Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906).
For a complete discussion of the shareholder's preemptive right, see 11 Flet-
cher, Corporations, 218-238, §§ 5135-5141. The right is now generally recog-
nized as to voting shares, either by judicial decision or by statute. Id. at 218,
§ 5135.
150. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 28 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1108].
151. Although Section 28 of the Louisiana Business Corporation Act does
not expressly provide for assignability, the implication of this right Is well
supported by the authorities. 11 Fletcher, Corporations, 233.
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holder is denied his right to subscribe for additional shares, he
may bring an action for damages, for specific performance, or to
enjoin the wrongful derangement of his proportionate voting
powers.
BY-LAws
Under Section 29, subsection 11,152 the corporation's inherent
power 58 to adopt by-laws resides in the shareholders. The board
of directors may be given a general power to make by-laws
through an express provision in the articles, but such director-
made by-laws are subject to change or repeal by the shareholders.
A general provision in the articles empowering the directors to
make or alter by-laws does not include a power to make or alter
by-laws fixing their own qualifications, classification, term of
office, or compensation. Such a power may, however, be specific-
ally vested in the directors by the articles or shareholder-made
by-laws. The Uhiform Act forbids such action by the board of
directors.15 4 Subsection II provides a nonexclusive enumeration of
matters which may be covered by the by-laws.
In line with a similar declaration relating to the articles,""
subsection III states that third persons dealing with the corpora-
tion shall not be charged with constructive notice of the by-laws.
The officers, directors, and shareholders are left subject to the
general rule that they are conclusively presumed to know the cor-
poration's by-laws or amendments thereto, and they remain actu-
ally ignorant thereof at their peril.156 For example, where the
corporate by-laws provide that "the tenure of all officers of this
corporation shall be during the pleasure of the board of directors,"
the Louisiana court held that an officer holding over after a
twelve months' employment contract was "presumed to have
known" the precarious tenure by which he held his position, and
could not complain when he was suddenly discharged.1 57 The pro-
vision is susceptible to the construction that, where a shareholder
152. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 29, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1109, I].
153. "The power to adopt by-laws is inherent in every corporation.
8 Fletcher, Corporations, 641, citing State v. Bank of Louisiana, 5 Mart. (N.S.)
327 (1827). But It Is of such great importance that ". . . as a general rule
the power is expressly conferred by the laws from which corporate existence
is derived." 8 Fletcher, supra at 643.
154. Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 26, III, 9 U.L.A. 78 (Perm. ed.
1932). This sound prohibition might well have been adopted in the Louisiana
act.
155. See Section 11, discussed supra p. 607.
156. For a full citation of authorities see 8 Fletcher, Corporations, 746-
750, notes 48-50, 60-63.
157. Hunter v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 13 (1874).
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deals with the corporation in a transaction not growing out of or
dependent upon his shareholder relationship, he may be treated
as a stranger and not charged with constructive notice of its by-
laws.' 1
SHAREHOLDERS' MEETINGS
Section 30119 requires that at least one shareholders' meeting
shall be held each year. The time, place, notice, and manner of
calling and conducting the shareholders' meetings should be set
out in the by-laws. " ' It is the plain ministerial duty of the direc-
tors, president, or such other officer as is designated in the by-
laws, to call the annual meetings at the designated time. A writ of
mandamus will issue at the instance of a stockholder to compel
the calling of a shareholders' meeting, and it is no defense that the
officer charged with the duty was fearful as to the action the
shareholders might take.1'6 Whenever more than eighteen months
pass without the annual shareholders' meeting having been held,
any shareholder may call such meeting.' 62 Also, special meetings
must be called by the Secretary, upon the written request of any
director, or of any shareholder or shareholders holding one-fifth
of the voting power of all shareholders. 6 3 With the exception of
adjourned meetings, 64 and unless otherwise provided in the
articles or by-laws, the person calling a shareholders' meeting
shall cause a written notice of the time, place, and purpose of
158. Pearsall v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124 N.Y. 256, 26 N.E. 534 (1891).
A shareholder dealing with the telegraph company as a customer in sending
messages was held not to be chargeable with constructive notice of a resolu-
tion by the board of directors that the company would not be liable for mis-
takes in unrepeated messages.
159. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 30, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1110, I].
160. Id. at § 29, II(a) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1109, II(a)]. Where the date,
but not the hour, of the meeting was set out in the by-laws, the directors
could fix the time of meeting at 9 o'clock, A. M., that being a reasonable hour.
State v. Simms, 152 So. 395 (La. App. 1934).
161. State v. J. D. Kerr Gravel Co., 158 La. 324, 104 So. 60 (1925), St.
Paul, J., declared (158 La. 324, 326, 104 So. 60, 61): "The sum and substance
of the defense is that the president fears that said stockholders will elect
a board of directors and officers who may be unfavorable to himself and his
interests, and that he has never been requested in writing to call said meet-
ing.
"Such a position is, of course, untenable. It is the plain ministerial duty
of the president to call said meeting, whether requested to do so or not; and,
if the stockholders do anything they have no right to do, it will then be his
privilege to complain." For a full collection of cases in point see 5 Fletcher,
Corporations, 14, 15.
162. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 30, II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1110, II].
163. Ibid. Applied in Davidson v. American Paper Mfg. Co., 188 La. 69,
175 So. 753 (1937); Best v. Southern Hide Co., 170 La. 997, 129 So. 614 (1930).
164. La. Act. 250 of 1928, § 30, III [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1110, III]. The
provision that no notice of an adjourned meeting need be given is in accord
with the general rule. 5 Fletcher, Corporations, 77.
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such meeting to be given to all voting shareholders at least ten
days prior to the date fixed. The right to such notice may be
waived in writing by any shareholder. 1 5
The safest procedure in calling and holding a shareholders'
meeting is to comply strictly with all the requirements of Section
30. Failure to give proper notice may be a ground for setting
aside an election of directors.16  Such a result, however, does not
always follow procedural irregularities. Where the substantial
rights of stockholders are not affected,'"' or where all sharehold-
ers are present and concur in the action taken, the validity of the
proceedings is not affected by a failure to comply with directory
provisions.' 8 The requirement of subsection V, that a stockhold-
ers' list shall be produced upon the request of any shareholder,
will probably be treated as directory. A New Jersey court has
held that noncompliance with such a requirement, or the fact
that the list furnished is false, will not, of itself, render the share-
holders' meeting and the proceedings therein invalid. 6"
The presence of a quorum is essential to the transaction of
corporate business, '70 and there can be no valid shareholder's
meeting unless this requirement is met."' Section 31'2 adopts the
general rule, previously recognized in Louisiana,'7 3 that, in the
absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, "the presence,
in person or by proxy, of the holders of a majority of the voting
power shall constitute a quorum." Final control is in the share-
holders, who may adopt a greater or lesser requirement by an
appropriate provision in the articles or by-laws. Once the meeting
is duly organized, there are to be no technical barriers to the ex-
peditious and complete transaction of corporate business. Clause
165. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 30, IV [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1110, IV].
166. Best v. Southern Hide Co., 170 La. 997, 129 So. 614 (1930). The irregu-
larity complained of was that the notice was not addressed to the proper
party. The court held that the complaining shareholder's remedy "is not to
ask for a receiver, but to demand a new stockholders' meeting [plaintiff
controlled 24% of the corporate stock], or she may bring suit to set aside the
election of J. B. Best as director." (170 La. 997, 1004, 129 So. 614, 617.)
167. Bartlett v. Fourton, 115 La. 26, 38 So. 882 (1905).
168. 5 Fletcher, Corporations, 95, § 2024.
169. Downing v. Potts, 23 N.J. Law 66 (1851).
170. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 31, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1111, I]. Clause
II(c) provides for adjournment when a quorum is not present.
171. Davidson v. American Paper Mfg. Co., 188 La. 69, 175 So. 753 (1937);
Hill v. Town, 172 Mich. 508, 138 N.W. 334 (1912).
172. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 31, 11(a) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1111, 11(a)].
173. Peirce v. New Orleans Building Co., 9 La. 397 (1836), holding that
the shareholders could not take valid, corporate action when less than a
majority were present, and that the subsequent individual assent of a ma-
jority of the shareholders did not validate the minority action.
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(b) states that if a quorum is present at the organization of the
meeting, the subsequent retirement of enough shareholders to
leave less than a quorum does not prevent those remaining from
transacting business. This forestalls the possibility that a group
of obstructionist shareholders might prevent valid action by
withdrawing from the meeting.7 " ' Similarly, clause (d) expressly
declares that a majority of the votes actually cast, and not neces-
sarily a majority of the votes represented, shall decide any matter
brought before the meeting. Express care is taken that meetings
called for the important purpose of electing directors shall not be
frustrated by indefinite and repeated adjournments for the lack
of a quorum. Such meetings may be adjourned only from day to
day.1' 5 Also, those attending the second adjourned meeting,
although less than a quorum, shall proceed to elect directors.1 76
CORPORATE ACTION BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT
Section 64177 provides that corporate action requiring share-
holder authorization may be had by the unanimous written con-
sent of the voting shareholders, without the necessity of a share-
holders' meeting. Shareholder action by unanimous consent is not
provided for in the Uniform Act, and such a procedure is beset
with practical difficulties with respect to large corporations. It
may, however, offer a useful device to smaller companies. The
formal requirements of this section must be strictly complied
with. In Renauld v. Marine Specialty & Mill Supply Co.1_78 the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that a shareholders' meeting could
be dispensed with only by a written agreement, signed in dupli-
cate by all the shareholders, and accompanied by a certificate of
174. There was some conflict at common law. Compare Commonwealth
v. Vandegrift, 232 Pa. 53, 81 Atl. 153 (1911), applying the majority view that
those remaining may continue to transact business; with Bridgers v. Staton,
150 N.C. 216, 63 S.E. 892 (1909), holding that a quorum must be present at the
time of voting. See also Commissioners' Notes to corresponding Section 30
of the Uniform Business Corporation Act, 9 U.L.A. 84 (Perm. ed. 1932).
175. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 30, III [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1110, III].
176. Id. at § 31, II(c) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1111, II(c)]: "Without the
last clause of this subdivision, an entrenched board of directors could pre-
vent the holding of an election .... It has been held that, except where the
statute, charter or by-laws provide otherwise, those shareholders present at
a duly called annual meeting held for the election of directors have not only
the right but the duty to elect directors, and the majority may not, by ab-
senting themselves from such meeting, prevent such election." Commission-
ers' Notes to corresponding Section 30, II(c) of the Uniform Act, 9 U.L.A.
84, 85 (Perm. ed. 1932).
177. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 64 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1144].
178. 172 La. 835, 135 So. 374 (1931), holding that the unanimous oral con-.
sent of the shareholders was not binding on the corporation.
[Vol. II
THE LOUISIANA CORPORATION ACT
the corporation secretary to the effect that the subscribers consti-
tuted all the shareholders entitled to vote on the particular ques-
tion.
VOTING RIGHTS
Section 32, 1,171 declares that, unless otherwise provided in the
articles, "each shareholder of record shall be entitled to one vote
for each share of stock standing in his name on the corporate
books." It is not uncommon, however, to deprive the preferred
stock of voting rights, and the articles may be so drawn as to con-
centrate the voting power in a relatively small class of share-
holders.18 0 Those shares excluded from general voting powers are
afforded a measure of protection by the requirement in Section 42
that important amendments to the articles must be approved by
every class of shareholders, whether voting or non-voting.18'"
Cumulative voting in the election of directors affords minor-
ity interests the opportunity to secure representation on the
board of directors. The operation is simple: a shareholder is per-
mitted to multiply the number of votes to which he is entitled,
by the total number of directors to be elected. He may cast all
such votes for one, or possibly more, candidates. For example, a
minority shareholder or group holding 20% of the stock is mathe-
matically certain to be able to elect one of five directors; while
under the ordinary method of voting, the majority could elect all
five. Through the director thus elected, the minority has a direct
contact with the business, and is able to secure first hand infor-
mation as to management and operation of the company.
The Louisiana provision'1 2 is permissive, in that it merely
authorizes a grant of cumulative voting privileges. The privilege
179. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 32, I [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1112, I]. This pro-
vision has been very properly held inapplicable to an insurance company.
State v. Carradine, 12 La. App. 42, 125 So. 135 (1929). See also La. Act 250
of 1928, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1081].
180. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 3, I(f) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1080, I(f)], pro-
vides that the articles shall contain a description of the various classes of
shares "and the designations, voting powers, preferences, . . ." etc. of each
class. The articles may provide for the issuance of a substantial class of
shares without or with only limited voting powers.
181. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 42, III, IV [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1122, III, IV].
Subsection III provides that where an amendment would make a change in
the rights of a particular class of shares, a class vote of the shareholders
affected is necessary for its adoption. Subsection IV provides that where an
amendment would make a change in the corporate name or a substantial
change in the corporate purpose or purposes, a two-thirds vote of every
class of shares, voting by classes, is necessary for its adoption.
182. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 32, II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1112, II], reads,
"The articles may provide. . .."
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must be expressly provided for in the articles, and an attempt to
confer the right through a by-law will be ineffective. 183 The Uni-
form Act contains a provision of the mandatory type, granting an
absolute right to vote cumulatively to the shareholders of all cor-
porations.' The cumulative voting right provides a valuable
safeguard for minority interests, and there is much to be said for
the mandatory grant. It does not depend upon the will of the in-
corporators and is not subject to being withdrawn by the majority
through an amendment of the articles.'8 5
The early common law rule that a shareholder must vote in
person'18 6 has been changed by modern corporation statutes. Sec-
tion 32, subsection III of the Louisiana Act authorizes voting by
proxy. 'T No particular form or words are necessary to constitute
a proxy; but it must be in writing, signed by the shareholder, and
filed with the secretary. The Act expressly stipulates that the
proxy shall be revocable at will, notwithstanding any agreement
or provision to the contrary. Thus, even a proxy "based upon a
consideration" or "coupled with an interest" is revocable. 8 8 The
183. In re Brophy, 13 N.J. Misc. 462, 179 Atl. 128 (1935), interpreting a
similar permissive type statute.
184. Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 28, III, 9 U.L.A. 79 (Perm. ed.
1932). Seventeen states have mandatory enactments (by statute or constitu-
tional provision), while fifteen fall in the permissive classification. Bowes and
De Dow, Cumulative Voting at Elections of Directors of Corporations (1937)
21 Minn. L. Rev. 351, 352, notes 6 and 9.
185. "While it is possible to conceive of situations in which the grant
of the privilege of voting cumulatively might turn out to be valueless or a
needless refinement, it is difficult to imagine any situation in which that
privilege would be a burden or handicap to persons other than those com-
prising a majority group which desires to exclude the minority from any
participation in the management of corporate affairs in derogation of the
very purpose underlying such enactments. This being the case, if the
privilege is to be granted at all, the grant should not be at the will of incor-
porators who may compose the majority group, nor should a majority be
afforded the opportunity to withdraw any such grant at its pleasure by
amending the corporate charter or by-laws." Bowes and De Bow, supra note
184, at 370.
The blanket amending power granted by Section 42 of the Louisiana Act
would enable the holders of two-thirds of the voting shares to repeal a pro-
vision authorizing cumulative voting.
186. Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J. Law 222, 27 Am. Dec. 33 (1834). The de-
cisions were conflicting as to whether authority to vote by proxy could be
conferred by a by-law, in the absence of express statutory sanction. 9 U.L.A
81 (Perm. ed. 1932).
187. For a discussion of some of the problems and abuses arising out of
proxy voting, see Bernstein and Fisher, The Regulation of Solicitation of
Proxies (1940) 7 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 226.
188. It is the general rule that a proxy is irrevocable where "based upon
a consideration" or "coupled with an interest." 5 Fletcher, Corporations, 188,
n. 99. The Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 28, IV, recognizes the re-
vocability of a proxy "coupled with an interest." 9 U.L.A. 79 (Perm. ed. 1932).
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provision that the validity of a proxy stating no definite period of
duration shall automatically cease eleven months after its execu-
tion, puts a desirable check upon the continued effectiveness of
stale proxies. There is no restriction upon the stated duration of a
proxy, except that the proxy may always be revoked by a written
notice to the secretary or the filing of a later proxy.
Subsection V of Section 32 stipulates that a person in whose
name shares are registered in a fiduciary capacity may vote the
same. 8 ' Nevertheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court, following a
well-settled rule of general jurisprudence, has held that an ad-
ministrator or executor is entitled to vote shares owned by a suc-
cession, without the necessity of a formal transfer of the stock on
the corporate books.190
Bondholders are without voting rights, and such power may
be conferred upon them only by express consent of the state. Sub-
section VIII empowers the corporation to provide in its articles
for granting of voting rights to bondholders. It is not uncommon
to authorize a transfer of full voting rights, or the power to elect
a majority of the board of directors, to bondholders in case of
default in interest payments to them for a specified number of
times. Such provisions enable the bondholders to assume man-
agement of the corporation until the defaults are made good,
whereupon their voting rights terminate, and the voting control
reverts to the shareholders. 191 By such an arrangement expensive
and unsatisfactory receivership proceedings may often be averted.
The voting trust is generally regarded as a device to be used,
and sometimes abused, for vote control. There has been consider-
able conflict, at least in the verbiage of the decided cases, con-
cerning the validity of voting trust agreements. Some courts have
held them void. In doing so they usually announce the policy
argument that participating shareholders breach their duty to
other owners of stock when they strip themselves of the power to
189. Subsections IV and VI, dealing with the voting of pledged shares
and shares owned by one corporation in another, are self-explanatory. Sub-
section VII declares that treasury and unissued shares shall not be voted
or counted in calculating voting power.
190. Davidson v. American Paper Mfg. Co., 188 La. 69, 175 So. 753 (1937).
191. For a fine discussion of the problem, with suggested provisions and
procedure, see Tracy, The Problem of Granting Voting Rights to Bondhold-
ers (1935) 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 208, 212-216.
Similar authority for granting voting rights to security holders has also
been conferred by statute in Delaware, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, and Virginia
(Statutes collected by Tracy, supra at 213). The Uniform Business Corpora-
tion Act does not contain such a provision.
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exercise the voting prerogative.19 2 The modem and better view is
that such agreements are valid where the purpose is proper.193
Subjected to necessary limitations as to purpose, the voting trust
may be very useful, and provides an effective means for the scat-
tered shareholders in a large corporation to secure a voice in its
operation. There is nothing illegal in a combination by sharehold-
ers for the purpose of securing management of the corporation by
responsible persons as directors.194 Yet an agreement contemplat-
ing the election of directors obligated to select one of the contract-
ing parties as president was properly held void and unenforcable
by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Williams v. Fredericks.195
Chief Justice O'Niell stressed the generally accepted idea that the
authority and fiduciary duty of directors to exercise a free and
disinterested discretion in the selection of corporate officers should
not be bartered away.
Section 33196 of the Louisiana Act, in common with practi-
cally all modem corporation statutes, 9 7 expressly authorizes the
voting trust. Trusts formed under this provision are irrevocable
for the period stated in the agreement,9 8 but may not exceed ten
years in duration. A voting trust for a longer period would prob-
ably be held totally invalid.99 The requirements that the agree-
ment among the shareholders (which is essential to a voting
trust) shall be in writing and filed in the registered office of the
corporation, must be strictly complied with if a valid trust is to be
192. For collection of cases in point, see 5 Fletcher, Corporations, § 2078,
notes 53-57, 275-276. The various arguments against the validity of the voting
trust are raised and answered in an article by Burke, Voting Trusts Cur-
rently Observed (1940) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 347, 354 et seq.
193. "The tide of opinion is now away from condemnation towards a
discerning approval." 5 Fletcher, Corporations, 276, citing Mackin v. Nicollet
Hotel, 25 F.(2d) 783 (C.C.A. 8th, 1928). Accord: Alderman v. Alderman, 178
S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897 (1935), noted favorably (1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 727.
194. See Williams v. Fredericks, 187 La. 987, 988, 175 So. 642, 646 (1937).
195. 187 La. 987, 989, 175 So. 642, 644. Accord: Cone v. Russell, 48 N.J. Eq.
208, 21 Atl. 847 (1891), agreement for proxy, providing that the directors to
be elected should employ the one giving the proxy at a fixed salary, held
invalid; McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934), noted (1934)
11 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 640, mutual agreement of majority stockholders to con-
tinue each other as directors and officers, held invalid.
196. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 33 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1113].
197. See Burke, supra note 192, at 348, 360, for a history and collection of
such statutory provisions.
198. In re Morse, 247 N.Y. 290, 160 N.E. 374 (1928).
199. A voting trust for a period of 11 years, when the Delaware statute
imposed a time limitation of 10 years, was held to be wholly invalid, not
merely void as to the excess period. Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co.,
191 At. 823 (Del. Ch. 1937).
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created.200 The trustee must accept the trust. This may be done
by his acting under the trust;20 1 but, the presence of his signature
on the agreement is decidedly preferable.
In a voting trust, created under Section 33, there is no separa-
tion of the voting power from the stock. The shareholders, pursu-
ant to the agreement, transfer their certificates to the trustee or
trustees, to be cancelled and reissued in the name of the trustee
with proper reference to the agreement on the new certificates.202
The trustee then issues voting trust certificates to the shareholders
in lieu of the stock certificates thus transferred. These certificates
are transferable in the same manner and with the same effect as
share certificates. 20 3 The net result is that the voting power is in
the trustee in whose name the shares now stand,20 4 while the ben-
eficial interest is in the trust certificate holders who receive the
dividends, less the expenses of administering the trust.
The voting trust is continuously subject to potential enlarge-
ment, until all shareholders become parties to it. Subsection III
provides that other shareholders shall at any time have the right
to come into the trust arrangement upon the same terms and with
the same benefits as the shareholders originally participating.
This prevents the participants from arbitrarily excluding certain
minority shareholders. At the same time it makes it possible for
majority shareholders to gain control of a voting trust originally
organized by a minority group.
DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND AGENTS
Section 34 vests the general management of the business and
affairs of the corporation exclusively in a board of directors
elected by the shareholders.20 5 Subsection I fixes the minimum
number of directors at three, but sets no outside limit. The direc-
tors need not be shareholders and need not be residents of Louisi-
ana. Special restrictions may be imposed by the articles or by-
laws.206 The term of office is one year, unless otherwise provided,
200. In Williams v. Fredericks, 187 La. 987, 1001, 175 So. 642, 647, it was
held that an agreement could not be sustained as a voting trust under Sec-
tion 33, since it was not "in writing" and "filed at the registered office of the
corporation." Valuable precautions in the drawing of a voting trust agree-
ment are suggested by Burke, supra note 192, at 374.
201. In re Bartleson Co., 275 Fed. 390 (1920).
202. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 33, I, III, IV [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1113, I, III,
IV].
203. Id. at § 33, V [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1113, VI.
204. Id. at § 33, VI, VII [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1113, VI, VII].
205. Id. at § 34, I, II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1114, I, II]. Under subsection
III(a) vacancies in the board are filled by the remaining directors.
206. The general rules of subsection I are prefaced by "unless otherwise
provided" clauses. Sections 29, II(d), and 34, III, state that the by-laws may
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but cannot exceed five years. Subsection III lays down certain
rules which apply "except as otherwise prescribed in the articles
or by-laws." Clause (c) permits meetings of the board to be held
at any place agreeable to a majority of the directors, whether in
or outside the state. Voting by proxy may be authorized by an
express provision in the articles, but otherwise is not per-
mitted.20 7 Clause (d) applies the general common law rule that a
majority of the directors is necessary for a quorum. Where the
quorum requirement has been met, valid action may be taken by
a majority vote of those directors present, and this is so even
though some have withdrawn, leaving less than a quorum. Clause
(e) provides that the board may delegate powers to committees
made up of two or more directors.
In the exercise of their powers of management, the directors
are entirely free from direct shareholder control. Even a unani-
mous resolution of the shareholders does not bind the corporation
in such matters, °8 and may be ignored by the board. A means of
immediate control of recalcitrant directors is furnished by the
provision in subsection III, clause (b), for the removal of direc-
tors, with or without cause, by a two-thirds vote of the sharehold-
ers. A proper limitation on this power is the stipulation that a
director elected by the exercise of the cumulative voting privilege
may be removed only for cause. The board of directors is also
authorized to remove a member for certain specified causes.20
Section 35210 vests the power of appointment and removal of
the officers and necessary agents of the corporation in the board
of directors. Only the president need be a director. The duties and
authority of such officers and agents may be prescribed in the
articles or by-laws, but in the absence of such provisions are to be
determined by the directors. Where there is no express authoriza-
provide the number, classification, tenure of office, qualifications, and com-
pensation of directors. For example, the by-laws might prescribe Louisiana
residence as a necessary qualification. Opinions of the Attorney General,
1934-36, p. 160.
207. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 35, VI [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1115, VI].
208. Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Cal. 11, 91 Am. Dec. 607 (1867). For a com-
plete discussion of the power of shareholders to bind a corporation, see Note
(1917) 15 Mich. L. Rev. 264; 5 Fletcher, Corporations, 348.
209. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 34, III(a) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1114, III(a)]:
. the board of directors may declare vacant the office of a director: (1) if
he be interdicted or be adjudicated a bankrupt; or (2) if he be absent from
the State continuously for a period of six months without leave granted by
the board, or if he become incapacitated by Illness or other infirmity to per-
form his duties for a like period; or (3) if he cease at any time to have the
qualifications required by the articles or by-laws."
210. Id. at § 35, I-II [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1115, I-I1].
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tion, either in the by-laws or by resolution of the directors, the
courts sometimes recognize authority based upon a sanction of
the past practice, custom, and dealings of the corporation. In a
Louisiana case, where it was shown to have been the usual prac-
tice for the general manager to conduct corporate affairs with
little advice or supervision from the board of directors, the court
overruled a defense that a note given by him to the plaintiff for
insurance premiums advanced to the corporation was not author-
ized by the directors.211 An estoppel element is invariably present
and stressed in such decisions.2'1 The estoppel arises from the fact
that the company has generally enjoyed the benefit of the action
of such officers and agents. Subsection VII empowers the presi-
dent, vice-president, or manager to take all reasonable and neces-
sary steps to represent the corporation in legal matters. Unless
expressly limited by the articles, by-laws, or resolution of the
board of directors, such officers may authorize the institution of
suits or appeals from adverse judgments,21 and direct the issu-
ance of conservatory writs. Such powers cannot be exercised by
subordinate officers, at least when those named are not absent
from the state.214
Section 36211 serves a very necessary purpose in view of the
unsettled state of the case law regarding the relationship of direc-
tors and officers to the corporation, and the standard of care to
which they are held. There has been considerable conflict in judi-
cial declarations as to the status of a director or officer. Many
211. Harris v. H. C. Talton Wholesale Grocery Co., 123 So. 480 (La. App.
1929). The manager was, incidentally, the second largest shareholder in the
corporation.
212. Id. at 482. Quoting from Gueydan v. T. P. Ranch Co., 156 La. 397,
100 So. 541 (1924), where the court stated, "'A corporation may not, any more
than an individual, reap the benefits flowing from the acts of its officers and
repudiate the obligations arising from the same acts .... A course of con-
duct pursued by a corporation for many years in permitting an officer to
do an authorized [not ultra vires] act, is an acquiescence in such act and
creates an estoppel.'"
213. Pierson v. Victory Industrial Life Ins. Co., 18 La. App. 327, 134 So.
425 (1931). The court relied on Section 35, VII, in holding that the president
of a corporation could appeal from an adverse judgment and sign the appeal
bond, without specific authorization by the board of directors.
214. Donohoe Oil & Gas Co. v. Mack-Jourden Co., 144 So. 169 (La. App.
1932), reversing former opinion 142 So. 713 (La. App. 1931). The court dis-
solved a writ of sequestration issued on the affidavit of a subordinate em-
ployee as "acting manager." It was intimated that the writ might have been
sustained upon a showing that the officers authorized by Section 35, VII, were
absent at the time.
215. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 36 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1116].
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decisions refer to him as an "agent. '216 Probably a majority of
opinions describe him as a "trustee. '217 Both terms, if strictly ap-
plied, are misleading and inaccurate. In line with an increasing
tendency of both courts and writers to emphasize the fiduciary
character of the director's status, instead of forcing it into one of
the conventional classifications, 218 Section 36 declares that "offi-
cers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation
to the corporation." Thus, without the abstruse niceties and exact-
itudes of a stereotyped classification, the courts can hold the cor-
porate officer or director to a practical standard of good faith,
loyalty, and honesty. The clear phraseology of the Louisiana pro-
vision should facilitate accurate and consistent judicial expres-
sion, but will have little effect upon the actual decisions. In
certain frequently recurring situations the lines have become
pretty well drawn, and it does not appear to have made a great
deal of difference whether the corporate director was character-
ized as a "trustee," "agent," or "fiduciary."
A Louisiana court has recently approved the generally ac-
cepted proposition that an officer or director may make a valid
contract with the corporation if the latter is represented by a dis-
interested majority of the board of directors or by other inde-
pendent, competent agents. 219 However, such contracts are subject
216. Ellett v. Newland, 171 La. 1019, 132 So. 761 (1931), where the direc-
tors and officers of a banking corporation were characterized as "agents."
Accord: Ten Eyck v. Pontiac R.R., 74 Mich. 226, 41 N.W. 905 (1889); Briggs
v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 11 S.Ct. 924, 35 L.Ed. 662 (1891).
217. Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo. 475 (1885). For a full collection of cases in
point, see Uhlman, The Legal Status of Corporate Directors (1939) 18 B. U.
L. Rev. 12, 13, n. 12.
218. The article by Uhlman, supra note 217, is a very complete and able
discussion of the conflicting views as to the legal status of the corporate
director. The writer reaffirms the apt suggestion by Johnson, Corporate Di-
rectors as Trustees in Illinois (1929) 23 Ill. L. Rev. 653, 671, that "A director
classified as a trustee is a round peg in a square hole; and put with the agent
he is sometimes a square peg in a round hole .. " See also Note (1939) 39
Col. L. Rev. 219, where the inapplicability of the trustee concept is pointed
out.
For a collection of cases where the court simply designated the directors
as fiduciaries, see Uhlman, supra at 16, n. 28.
219. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hahn, 190 So. 869 (La. App.
1939), noted (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 374. See also 3 Fletcher, Corpora-
tions, 287. Cf. In Allardyce v. Abrahams, 190 La. 686, 182 So. 717 (1938), dis-
cussed by the writer in Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court (1939) 1
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 314, 404, the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated a ten-
dency to bear unduly hard on the conscientious officer or director. There, a
general manager had personally paid off a corporate note to stave off an
anxious creditor, and had received the note. Although the court allowed the
purchasing officer to recover on the note, it stressed the fact that there was
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to close scrutiny by the courts; and, notwithstanding their ap-
proval by a disinterested majority of the board of directors, will
be set aside upon proof of the slightest unfairness or imposition
practiced on the corporation.2
The right of a director to take personal advantage of corpo-
rate opportunities has been much litigated and discussed. 21 Here
the director or officer has not been judged by the same strict stand-
ards as the trustee under an express trust. Yet he is not entirely
free to avail himself of such opportunities. In Lawrence v. Sutton-
Zwolle Oil Company2 2 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the directors of an oil company could individually secure avail-
able oil leases and were under no duty to acquire them for the
benefit of the corporation. In so deciding, Justice Fournet applied
the general rule that "whether in any case an officer of a corpora-
tion is duty bound to purchase property for the corporation, or to
refrain from purchasing property for himself, depends upon
whether the corporation has an interest, actual or in expectancy,
in the property, or whether the purchase of the property by the
officer may hinder or defeat the plans and purpose of the corpora-
tion in the carrying on or development of the legitimate business
for which it was created. ' ' 223 The abstract rule is best understood
by a classification and analysis of actual decisions. It has been
held that a mere negotiation or desire for the purchase or lease of
property does not create such an expectancy in favor of the cor-
poration as to preclude acquisition of the property by its officers.2 24
But, where the corporation has expended money and substantial
effort in an attempt to acquire the property, an expectancy is
no offer to reimburse him for the money paid out; and declared, by way of
dictum, that such a transaction might be set aside as voidable. It is sug-
gested that there had been no breach of the officer's fiduciary relation and
that the transaction should have been treated as entirely valid. Twin-Lick
Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 23 L.Ed. 328 (1875).
220. Crescent City Brewing Co. v. Flanner, 44 La. Ann. 22, 10 So. 384
(1892). The directors of a corporation in bad financial condition authorized
the sale of property costing $100,000.00, and necessary to the corporate busi-
ness, to one of the directors for $20,000.00. The sale was set aside upon its
repudiation by a new board of directors.
221. Lake, The Use for Personal Profit of Knowledge Gained While a
Director (1937) 9 Miss. L. J. 427; Comment (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 219.
222. 193 La. 117, 190 So. 351 (1939), discussed by the writer in Work of
the Louisiana Supreme Court (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 31, 131.
223. 193 La. 117, 133, 190 So. 351, 356, the rule followed was quoted from 3
Fletcher, Corporations, § 861.
224. Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 97 Colo. 309, 49 P. (2d) 429
(1935); Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933);
Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 545, 102 S.E. 249 (1920).
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recognized.2 15 Where property is necessary and essential to the cor-
porate business (as distinguished from property which is merely
desirable or useful) its acquisition by corporate officers would
hinder the business and development of the corporation and comes
under the second clause of the general prohibition. Again, direc-
tors and officers may not engage in a competing business and
must account to the corporation for profits thus diverted.2 1 It was
held in a recent Louisiana case227 that an officer who received pay-
ment for revealing corporate assets to a judgment creditor had
made a secret profit "in disregard of his fiduciary relation" and
must account to the corporation.
In determining the degree of care which directors and officers
must exercise, courts have run the gamut, from the rigorous re-
quirement that such officers must exercise the care which the
ordinary prudent man would use "in his own business, "228 to the
view that they are to be held only in case of "gross negligence.'22 9
Section 36 adopted the middle ground rule, enunciated in the
leading case of Briggs v. Spaulding, 280 that officers and directors
must discharge their duties with that amount of care which "or-
dinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances
in like positions." A mere error in judgment will not render the
officer or director liable.22 1
The cause of action against officers and directors for losses
225. De Bardeleben v. Bessemer Land & Improvement Co., 140 Ala. 621,
37 So. 511 (1904). A corporate tenant in possession under a lease has an ex-
pectancy of renewal, even though it may have no legal right to renew as
against the lessor. Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So.
199 (1900); Robinson v. Jewett, 116 N.Y. 40, 22 N.E. 224 (1889).
226. Coleman v. Hangar, 210 Ky. 309, 275 S.W. 784 (1925). The resultant
"adversity of interest" is Important in such cases; the director cannot faith-
fully serve two gods and is likely to favor that of self-interest.
227. Louisiana Mortg. Corp. v. Pickens, 167 So. 914 (La. App. 1936). Dore,
J., pointed out that it was unimportant that the corporation showed no
injury, since the debt enforced was an honest one, and that the officer could
have been forced to disclose the corporate assets. "The important fact is that
Trotti owed the duty to the corporation of which he was an officer to give it
the benefit of any and all profits which he made in dealing with the affairs
of the corporation." (167 So. 914, 915).
228. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880). Also dissenting opinion of Harlan,
J., in Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 11 S.Ct. 924, 35 L.Ed. 662 (1891).
229. Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11, 10 Am. Rep. 684 (1872).
230. 141 U.S. 132, 11 S.Ct. 924, 35 L.Ed. 662 (1891).
231. Reliance Homestead Ass'n v. Nelson, 179 La. 680, 154 So. 734 (1934).
The president of plaintiff, Homestead Ass'n, was not liable for an error injudgment in making an untimely payment to a borrower. The court found
that the defendant had acted with reasonable care and in good faith. Accord:
Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 68, 78 (1829), Porter, J., declared: "The
test of responsibility therefore should be, not the certainty of wisdom in
others, but the possession of ordinary knowledge. ..
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occasioned by their nonfeasance or misfeasance belongs to the
corporation, and the shareholders cannot sue as individuals to
recover the resultant depreciation in the value of their shares.23 2
In the background lurks the important practical consideration
that to allow individual shareholders' actions would result in a
multiplicity of suits. Where the corporate officers refuse to sue,
the shareholder may bring a representative suit to enforce the
corporate cause of action.
REGISTERED OFFICE AND RESIDENT AGENT
Section 37282 requires every corporation to maintain a reg-
istered office and appoint two or more resident agents for the
service of process. The location and post-office address of the
registered office must be stated in the articles, and a written no-
tice thereof filed with the clerk of the district court in the parish
where such office is situated. A change in the place of the regis-
tered office may be effected by a vote of the board of directors
without the formality of an amendment to the articles. Notice of
the change and the post-office address of the new registered office
must be filed with the Secretary of State and with the clerk of
court in the parish in which it is located. In Canal Bank & Trust
Co. v. Greco 23 4 the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized a change
of domicile where the resolution had been adopted at a sharehold-
ers', rather than at a directors', meeting. Justice Overton empha-
sized the fact that all the directors were present and took part in
the unanimous adoption of the resolution, and declared that the
vote of the stockholders as such should be "deemed to be surplus-
age." The court's liberal attitude was voiced in the conclusion,
"We think that there has been, while, perhaps, not a literal com-
pliance with the statute yet a substantial compliance with it. .. "
Subsection II requires the appointment of not less than two
natural persons, of full age, and residents of the parish, to act as
agents, upon whom legal process or other demands upon the cor-
poration may be served. 23 ' The formalities prescribed in connec-
232. Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. 371, 46 Am. Dec. 690 (1847).
233. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 37 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1117]. This section
supplements Section 3, I(c) and (d); and is, In turn, supplemented by the
definition of "Registered Office" in Section 1, XIV.
234. 177 La. 507, 148 So. 693 (1933). Cf. Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Cal. 11,
91 Am. Dec. 607 (1867), supra note 208. For a general discussion of the neces-
sity of a formal directors' meeting, see Ballantine, Private Corpolrations
(1927) 326, § 100.
235. Where by death, resignation, or removal from the parish, the num-
ber of resident agents is reduced to less than two, a new agent or agents
must be appointed within 30 days.
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tion with the appointment of resident agents and their successors
are the same as those for the establishment and change of the
registered office. Where the agents for service of process have
been duly appointed, service upon any other officer of the corpo-
ration will be held invalid.2 6 Also, domiciliary service at the
home of one of the authorized agents, temporarily absent at the
time, is ineffective.2 37
Where the corporation has failed to designate agents, or a
vacancy has occurred, subsection III authorizes the service of pro-
cess "upon any officer, director or resident agent named in the
articles or the last report previously filed with the Secretary of
State, or on any employee over the age of sixteen years found in
the corporation's registered office or in any place where the busi-
ness of the corporation is regularly conducted." Relying upon the
above provision, a Louisiana court has held that service upon the
original secretary-treasurer of a corporation, which had failed to
designate resident agents, constituted valid service; and it made
no difference that the person served was no longer connected in
any capacity with the corporation. 88 As a last resort, in the event
that none of the corporate officers or adult employees can be lo-
cated, service may be made upon the Secretary of State or Assis-
tant Secretary of State.
BOOKS, RECORDS, AND ANNUAL REPORTS
The right to information is important to every shareholder.
Unless he can apprise himself on corporate affairs, his right to
vote becomes a mirage. Every Louisiana Constitution since 1879239
has imposed an obligation on domestic and foreign corporations
doing business in this state to maintain a stock transfer office and
to keep books "for public inspection," showing the amount of
capital stock subscribed, the ownership and transfers of such
stock, its assets and liabilities, and the names and residence of its
officers. Our courts have not interpreted the constitutional right
of inspection as unqualified or absolute, but have read into it the
general common law requirement that the inspection must be at
236. Service of process upon a local manager was held invalid in Mouton
v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 177 So. 431 (La. App. 1937). (Applying analogous
provision of a statute governing service on domestic insurance companies).
237. Frank Melat v. Cooper, 150 So. 432 (La. App. 1933).
238. Holzer Sheet Metal Works Inc. v. Arch Constr. Co. of La., 141 So. 872
(La. App. 1932).
239. La. Const. of 1879, Art. 245; La. Const. of 1898, Art. 273; La. Const.
of 1913, Art. 264; La. Const. of 1921, Art. 13, § 4.
[Vol. Ii
1940] THE LOUISIANA CORPORATION ACT 643
a reasonable time for a proper purpose.2 40 In the early case of
State v. New Orleans Gaslight Company241 Justice Blanchard de-
clared:
"By 'public inspection' is meant not the inspection of the idle,
the impertinent, or the curious,-those without an interest to
subserve or advance or protect. It was never contemplated
that any and everybody, as the whim may seize him or them,
should be permitted to walk into the office of a company or
corporation, and pry into its affairs. But a shareholder or
other person with a laudable object to accomplish, or a real
and actual interest upon which to predicate his request for in-
formation disclosed by the books, is given, by the fundamental
law itself, the right to inspect them. 24 2
This rule has been repeatedly affirmed, but the courts have been
careful to point out that inspection should be denied a share-
holder only in exceptional cases, and the burden is upon the cor-
poration to sustain its allegations of improper motive.2 "4 The right
to examine the corporate books is generally upheld and enforced
by a writ of mandamus. Also, the shareholder is entitled to dam-
240. For a collection of cases enunciating the general common law rule
see 5 Fletcher, Corporations, 575-576, § 2214, n. 23.
241. 49 La. Ann. 1556, 22 So. 815 (1897). Followed In State v. Dalgarn
Constr. Co., 168 La. 620, 122 So. 884 (1929); Orlando v. Reliance Homestead
Ass'n, 171 La. 1027, 132 So. 777 (1930).
242. 49 La. Ann. 1556, 1558, 22 So. 815, 816 (1897). In State v. Atchafalaya-
Teche-Vermillon Co., 155 La. 882, 99 So. 633 (1924), the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that a creditor with an unliquidated claim against a corporation
was not entitled to inspect its books, accounts, and records and that the con-
stitutional provision was primarily for the protection of shareholders and
prospective investors. It was pointed out, however, by way of dictum, that a
judgment creditor, seeking to enforce his rights against shareholders, would
be entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the corporation to permit him
to ascertain who the shareholders were and the amount remaining unpaid on
their shares.
243. Orlando v. Reliance Homestead Ass'n, 171 La. 1027, 132 So. 777 (1930),
the shareholder sought to ascertain if the corporation was being misman-
aged; Cockburn v. Union Bank, 13 La. Ann. 289 (1858), same; Carey v. Dal-
garn Constr. Co., 168 La. 620, 122 So. 884 (1930), the owner of one-third of the
capital stock was seeking information as to the management and financial
condition of the corporation, and as to the net value of his stock; State v.
Bienville Oil Works Co., 28 La. Ann. 204 (1876), the stockholder was permitted
to examine the corporate books, with the assistance of a competent account-
ant, to determine how to vote on a proposal for the reduction of capital
stock. Cf. Finance Co. of America at Baltimore v. Brock, 80 F. (2d) 713
(C.C.A. 5th, 1936) where the stockholders, suing officers and directors for
fraudulent misrepresentations, sought a bill of discovery to compel the cor-
poration, not a party to the suit, to produce and permit examination of cor-
porate books and records. Sibley, J., declared (80 F. (2d) 713, 714) that the
proposal had "every appearance of a 'fishing' enterprise," since no specific
documents were sought; and continued that "The legal remedy for a wrongful
refusal is plain and swift, a mandamus."
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ages if he can show injury resulting from a wrongful refusal to
allow inspection. 44
Section 38, subsection 1245 of the Louisiana Business Corpora-
tion Act requires every corporation to keep, at its registered office,
records of the proceedings of the shareholders and of the direc-
tors; and a share register and transfer book showing the owner-
ship of its shares. This provision is supplemented by Act No. 12
of the Third Extra Session of 1934, which requires all corporations
to keep books with complete records and accounts of its assets,
liabilities, receipts, disbursements, gains, losses, capital, and sur-
plus.24
Subsection III of Section 38, declaring the shareholder's247
right to examine "any and all" corporate books and records, in-
cludes the already recognized and defined limitation that the ex-
amination shall be at a "reasonable time," and for "proper and
reasonable purposes."'24" It further safeguards the corporation
from officious intermeddling by the definite stipulation that only
a shareholder who has been the record holder of at least two per-
cent of the outstanding shares for the past six months shall have
the right of inspection. 249 It has been suggested that such a re-
quirement would effectually bar shareholders in a large corpora-
244. Bourdette v. Sieward, 52 La. Ann. 1333, 27 So. 724 (1900), the plaintiff
had been denied an examination of the corporate books, which would have
revealed the fact that several large shareholders were selling. As a result he
held his stock and bought more. The stock dropped in value and the court
held that the plaintiff had an action for damages against the corporate
officers.
245. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 38, I, as amended by Act 34 of 1935 (4 E.S.)
(Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1118, I].
Subsection II of Section 38 relieves a corporation of the obligation to
keep a share register at its registered office in this state, if it keeps such reg-
ister in some other state and has a transfer agent acting in this state.
246. This statute imposes substantial penalties on a corporation and its
officers for failure to keep such records. Regulations of the Secretary of
State indicating what is a sufficient compliance with this act are found in its
Corporation Handbook, 73-75.
Act 23 of the Third Extra Session of 1934 covers the same ground as, and
purports to put teeth in, the constitutional provision already discussed by
providing penalties for its violation. See Corporation Handbook, 72.
247. Subsection IV of Section 38 authorizes the corporation to expressly
confer the right of inspection upon the holders of bonds or other obligations
of the corporation.
248. The advisability of such an express safeguard is indicated by the
decision in State v. Werra Aluminum Foundry Co., 173 Wis. 651, 182 N.W. 354
(1921), where a statutory right of inspection was interpreted as absolute, and
the motive of the petitioning shareholder was treated as immaterial. Com-
pare, however, the interpretation put on Louisiana's constitutional right of
inspection, supra note 241. See also Ballantine, Private Corporations (1927)
552, with cases collected in notes 168-170.
249. The Michigan statute contains a substantially similar provision,
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tion from information;2 50 but it should be noted that two or more
shareholders, whose aggregate holdings equal the required per-
centage, are authorized to jointly inspect the corporate books.
Another query-does the two percentage requirement violate the
constitutional right of inspection presently found in Article 13,
Section 4, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921? In the analogous
case of State ex rel. Cotonio v. Italo-American Homestead Ass'n
2 51
Chief Justice O'Niell, speaking for a divided court, limited the
constitutional guaranty to a right to inspect those books and rec-
ords named therein. Thus interpreted, minute books, account
books, and certain other records required by Section 38 of the
Corporation Act and Act No. 12 of the Third Extra Session of
1934, would not come within its scope. As regards share transfer
books and those records clearly within the constitutional mandate,
an application of the two percent requirement may well be un-
constitutional.
A further limitation on the right of inspection is found in the
provision of subsection III that where stock is held by or for a
business competitor, or by one who is interested in or holds stock
in a competitive business, such shareholder "must own not less
than twenty-five percent of stock issued and outstanding for a
period of six months before he, or it, can demand the rights and
privileges set forth in this paragraph. '25 2 Possibly this require-
ment will be a trifle hard on the shareholder who is merely "in-
terested" or "holds stock" in a business competitor. Yet stringent
rules are necessary in order to curb shareholder blackmail and
unfair competition. Again, the objection of unconstitutionality
may raise its head.
Mich. Pub. Act 327 of 1931, § 45. The Idaho Act contains a ten percent re-
quirement, Idaho Laws of 1929, c. 262, § 31, Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 29-143.
Mullens v. Pioneer Gas Co., 154 So. 377 (La. App. 1934) is declaratory of
Section 38, III.
250. Rutledge, supra note 39, at 332.
251. 177 La. 766, 149 So. 449 (1933), cert. denied 290 U.S. 694, 54 S.Ct. 128,
78 L.Ed. 597 (1933); Note (1933) 8 Tulane L. Rev. 136. The court interpreted
Section 64 of Act 140 of 1932, which places all homestead associations under
the supervision of the state banking commissioner and provides for Inspec-
tions by the commissioner, as denying the shareholders in such associations
the right to examine minute books, applications for withdrawals, check stub
books, and other similar records of such companies. After setting out Article
13, Section 4 of the 1921 Constitution, O'Niell, C. J., declared (177 La. 766, 777,
149 So. 449, 452): "There Is nothing in these provisions of the Constitution
forbidding the Legislature to curtail the right of a stockholder in a corpora-
tion to inspect the corporation's books, other than those which are subject
to public inspection .... "
252. This probably means that such right of examination is subject to the
general limitation that it must be at a reasonable place, and for a reasonable
and proper purpose, and that shareholders may cumulate their holdings in
order to meet the required percentage.
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As an additional measure for the protection and information
of shareholders, prospective investors, and creditors, Section 39253
imposes a duty on the president, or certain other officers of the
corporation, to make an annual report to the Secretary of State.
Subsection I specifies the facts which must be included therein.
Subsection II provides that if such report is not filed within fif-
teen days after a written request by the Secretary of State, the
corporation shall be subject to a penalty of ten dollars for every
day of such neglect or refusal. This penalty is hardly sufficient to
be effective against a large corporation. The more extreme pen-
alty, in the Michigan and Indiana statutes,2 -5 4 of forfeiture of the
corporate charter for failure to file the report for two successive
years, appears entirely justified.
Subsection II further provides that once a year, upon the
request of any shareholder of record, the corporation shall send
such shareholder a properly verified copy of the last annual re-
port. It has been held that the furnishing of a copy of the annual
report is a ministerial duty, enforceable by mandamus. 255 Where
such statement is not furnished within fifteen days after re-
quested, the statute provides that the shareholder may recover
fifty dollars for every day of delay, from the officer or officers
charged with the duty of delivering it. Declaring that this pen-
alty provision was enacted "primarily to protect the investing
public" and not to penalize the corporate officer who acts in good
faith the Louisiana Supreme Court in Tichenor v. Tichenor, 56
refused to allow recovery of $4,500 in penalties from a corporation
president who mailed an honest and accurate report, but through
oversight failed to sign or verify the same.
Section 40 257 applies only to those corporations operating pub-
253. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 39 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1119]. See also the
requirement of annual reports for franchise tax purposes, La. Act 10 of 1935
(E.S.) § 1.
254. Mich. Pub. Act 327 of 1931, § 91; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 25-250.
Corresponding Section 36, II, of the Uniform Business Corporation Act pro-
vides a penalty of $50.00 per day for failure to file the annual report. 9 U.L.A.
89 (Perm. ed. 1932).
255. Tichenor v. Dr. G. H. Tichenor Co., 161 So. 198 (La. App. 1935).
256. 190 La. 77, 181 So. 863 (1938), discussed, Work of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court (1939) 1 LOUIIANA LAW REVIEW 314, 405. The court recognized the
fact that plaintiff shareholder had obviously refrained from pointing out the
technical defect in order to take advantage of the penalty feature of the act.
Fournet, J., also stressed the "universally recognized rule of law that statutes
imposing penalties must be strictly construed and every doubt must be re-
solved against the imposition of the penalty." (19 La. 77, 83, 181 So. 863, 864.)
257. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 40 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1120]. This provision
is not found in the Uniform Business Corporation Act, but is taken verbatim
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lic utilities under special or secondary franchises from the state.2 58
This section requires a statement which shall contain, in addition
to the information called for by Section 39, specific figures as to
receipts and disbursements. Also, a corporation failing to make
such a report is subject to more severe penalties" 9 than those im-
posed under Section 39.
CONCLUSION
Sections 41 through 65 govern fundamental changes in the
corporate organization or enterprises-voluntary transfer of all
corporate assets, amendment of the articles of incorporation, re-
duction of capital stock, merger and consolidation, proceedings for
dissolution, and action by state to vacate the corporate charter.
Space limitations have prevented a treatment of these problems
in the present article. 260
No discussion of the Louisiana Business Corporation Act
would be complete without the payment of tribute to those who
so carefully and ably drafted this statute.21 They have followed
the Uniform Business Corporation Act, but have incorporated a
number of substantial changes, mostly additions, which have ef-
fected a decided improvement. In several instances, however,
changes in phraseology were made which were merely the adop-
tion of a preferable and more elaborate mode of expressing the
rule of the Uniform Act. It is to be hoped that these variations
in expression will not deter our courts from accepting the full
benefit of decisions in sister states which have likewise adopted
the Uniform Business Corporation Act. 26 2
from La. Act 267 of 1914, § 22. For a discussion of the requirements of this
statute, see State v. Shreveport Water Works Co., 141 La. 1091, 76 So. 210
(1917).
258. State v. Riverside Irr. Co., 142 La. 10, 76 So. 216 (1917), wherein Mon-
roe, C. J., concludes (142 La. 10, 15, 76 So. 210, 218) "that the term 'franchise,'
as used in the statute, was intended to be applied to what are called 'second-
ary franchises,' being special privileges, in addition to the corporate franchise
which may be granted by the state (as the right of eminent domain) or by
a parish or municipality (as the right to operate a public ferry, or to make
use of a street)."
259. The corporation is subject to a penalty of $250.00 and $25.00 for each
additional day of delay after March 31, the deadline for filing the report.
260. The author plans a companion article, completing the survey of the
Louisiana Business Corporation Act.
261. The Joint Committee of the Louisiana State Bar Association and the
New Orleans Bar Association which prepared the statute was composed of
Charles E. Dunbar, Jr., and Walker B. Spencer, Co-Chairmen, assisted by
Charles Rosen, Irving R. Saal, John H. Tucker, Jr., and Rene A. Viosca.
262. La. Act 250 of 1928, § 71 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1151) provides, "This
Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate Its general purpose
to make uniform the law of those states which enact it." (Taken verbatim
from Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 76, 9 U.L.A. 105 (Perm. ed. 1932).
